The 2020 invasion of Nagorno-Karabakh and the 2022 invasion of Ukraine have, in some circles, been viewed as signalling the end of hybrid and unconventional warfare. This view, however, reflects a broader issue in how conflict is discussed—shaped by institutional biases and intellectual trends.
In Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, John A. Nagl highlights a key problem in the Vietnam War: South Vietnamese troops were trained to fight like US forces preparing for a Soviet assault in Europe. After Vietnam, counterinsurgency was dismissed, and emphasis shifted to technological dominance in conventional warfare—lessons drawn from Israel’s experience in the Yom Kippur War and reflected in the Gulf War victory. Yet this focus neglected the possibility that Vietnam could have been fought differently. As the West exits the Global War on Terror, there is again a risk of ignoring irregular warfare’s hard-won lessons.
David Kilcullen and Seth G. Jones argue in The Dragons and the Snakes and Three Dangerous Men that after witnessing the Gulf War, Russia, China, and Iran saw conventional war with the West as unwinnable. Instead, they turned to irregular methods—borrowing from Cold War successes and learning from Western setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The contrast between Gulf War success and the drawn-out failures of the Global War on Terror has led some to believe that the West can now return to conventional strategies. This thinking is rooted in Napoleonic ideas from Clausewitz and Jomini—emphasising decisive battle and clear boundaries between war and peace. Such ideas offer a tempting simplicity and an excuse to sidestep uncomfortable lessons, just as occurred post-Vietnam.
Yet Ukraine and Nagorno-Karabakh reflect hybrid warfare’s continued relevance. This form of conflict—first seen with the IRGC in Iraq—has been shaped by new technologies: GPS, drones, ATGMs, and technicals. Globalisation has also enabled the flow of fighters and the provision of support (training, intelligence, weapons) from states to local proxies.
Stephen Biddle, in Non-State Warfare, describes how non-state groups now use technology to fight in more conventional, or in his words Napoleonic, ways. Meanwhile, states increasingly adopt asymmetric, Fabian tactics. While some suggest a shift back to conventional warfare, ISIS’s campaign in Iraq and Syria—heavily reliant on Soviet-style manoeuvre tactics and led by ex-Ba’athist officers—was more conventional than the insurgency seen in Afghanistan for example.
Similarly, Ukraine’s conflict includes hybrid elements. Civilian drones, once associated with non-state actors, are now central to state-on-state warfare, illustrating the convergence of conventional and irregular tactics.
This continuity suggests that recent wars represent not a break but an evolution. This matters greatly for future conflicts, particularly in Taiwan. While the US anticipates a potential Chinese invasion by 2027, Taiwan continues to invest in platforms like F-16s and amphibious ships—assets unlikely to survive an opening Chinese missile barrage. These systems would be of limited use in a full-scale invasion, as they could be neutralised early on by China’s A2AD capabilities.
However, they could prove valuable if China uses hybrid strategies—akin to its South China Sea island-building or maritime militia operations. Still, the more likely threat is a blockade. This would allow China to use sea mines, submarines, and anti-ship missiles to encircle Taiwan and challenge US naval forces without launching a high-risk amphibious assault.
The question remains: how far would the US go to support Taiwan? A limited US role could embolden other actors. A recent example of a similar dynamic can be seen in Azerbaijan’s two-day operation in 2023 to seize the remainder of Nagorno-Karabakh, capitalising on Russia’s preoccupation with its war in Ukraine.
A similar dynamic could unfold in the Middle East. One US response to a Chinese blockade could involve cutting off China’s oil supply, possibly by blockading the Strait of Malacca and intercepting tankers. This could require redeploying US Fifth Fleet assets, creating an opening for Iran and its proxies.
We are already seeing the effects of a similar operation with Houthi attacks on global shipping. Iran’s network—including Hezbollah—could escalate disruptions further, especially if a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz were attempted. In 1988, the US struck Iran’s navy after a sea mine damaged a warship. A similar operation today would be far riskier, given Iran’s modern A2AD arsenal—loitering munitions, anti-ship missiles, and unmanned vehicles.
The US has recently increased its regional presence—stationing B-2 bombers in Diego Garcia and deploying an additional carrier under CENTCOM. But if a major Taiwan crisis draws US forces east, it is unclear whether such assets could be deployed to the Gulf. A distracted US might face much more serious disruption from Iran than seen so far.
Europe could also face escalation. If China acts on Taiwan, Russia might see an opportunity to press its claim over the post-Soviet space. The Baltic States are likely targets. However, unlike Ukraine, they lack strategic depth. If NATO is distracted, Russia might attempt a limited annexation similar to Crimea.
Despite setbacks in Ukraine, Russia could feasibly seize parts of Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania—perhaps via covert means like unmarked troops or saboteurs. NATO, uncertain and overstretched, might hesitate to respond. This could allow Russia to gain territory without triggering full-scale war with NATO powers like Poland or Finland. Though a gamble, a concurrent Asia-Pacific crisis could provide Russia with its best chance.
Rather than a global war, a more realistic scenario is a polycrisis—multiple overlapping disruptions across regions. Mutually assured destruction still deters large-scale war, but multiple concurrent flashpoints could cause strategic paralysis.
Kilcullen’s concept of Liminal Warfare is relevant here—states operating in the grey zone between peace and war, exploiting ambiguity to make incremental gains. With conflicts ongoing in Ukraine and Gaza, strategic bandwidth is already stretched. If China, Russia, and Iran act simultaneously—whether coordinated or opportunistic—the West may struggle to respond on all fronts.
To avoid this, the West must act now. Deterrence should be reinforced through irregular warfare readiness, diplomacy, sanctions, and tight coordination with allies. In an era of liminal, hybrid, and multi-domain conflict, strategic adaptability is essential.