Executive Summary
The fall of El Fasher to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in late October 2025 marked yet another pivotal moment in Sudan’s war. The country’s artisanal and industrial gold networks have become a vital financial lifeline for armed groups and their foreign backers. Sudan’s conflict can be understood in part as a struggle over gold and other resources, where local violence, regional strategies, and global commodity flows intersect and reinforce one another. At the core of this transnational war economy lies the United Arab Emirates (UAE), functioning both as a global trading hub for gold and as a conduit through which armed groups secure financing, weapons, and logistical support.
Introduction
After more than 500 days under siege, El-Fasher—the capital of North Darfur—fell to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), following an 18-month blockade that had already caused famine, widespread destruction, and relentless shelling and drone strikes. During this period, civilians across Darfur faced starvation, targeted killings, sexual violence, and assaults on refugee camps, prompting the UN Security Council to convene an emergency session on 30 October 2025. Satellite imagery from the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab documented mass atrocities in El-Fasher after the city’s fall, including executions inside medical facilities and against civilians attempting to flee, as well as clusters of ground discolouration consistent with human bodies (Raymond et al., 2025). Beyond its humanitarian toll, El-Fasher’s fall signals the deepening of a resource-driven war economy. In 2024, Sudan’s officially reported gold production totaled 64.36 tonnes, with over a million people engaged in artisanal and small-scale gold mining (ASGM) across extensive open-air sites in 12 of the country’s 18 federal states (Soliman and Baldo, 2025). Gold remains Sudan’s most lucrative and liquid resource, accounting for roughly half of total exports even during wartime. Its importance derives not only from intrinsic value but also from its integration into a regional and global financial architecture.
Analysis
Since South Sudan’s secession in 2011 and the resulting loss of oil revenue, gold has overtaken petroleum as Sudan’s primary source of foreign exchange (Soliman and Baldo, 2025). Across successive offensives—from Khartoum in 2023 to El Fasher in 2025—gold has repeatedly served as both a driver and instrument of war. Under Omar al-Bashir, control of mines in Darfur and Kordofan was delegated to security forces and allied militias, notably the Border Guards and the Janjaweed. Established in 2013 as a formal offshoot of the Janjaweed, the RSF inherited these coercive networks, evolving into a multifaceted organisation: an Arab militia in Darfur continuing counterinsurgency operations, a loyal security apparatus for Bashir, and a transnational enterprise exporting both fighters and gold (Craze, 2025). Gold’s liquidity makes it an ideal resource for financing war. As formal banking systems collapsed, the RSF relied on gold exports to acquire weapons, fuel, and food, enabling it to operate as a quasi-state actor independent of central fiscal oversight. Unlike oil, which was tightly controlled by the state, the dispersed artisanal nature of gold mining makes regulation difficult, allowing substantial quantities to evade official reporting (Soliman and Baldo, 2025). While Sudan’s civil war stems from a struggle for power and resources between the SAF, led by General Burhan, and the RSF under General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), the conflict cannot be fully understood without accounting for the central role the regional actors who profit from gold and sustain its extraction.
Yet interpreting these alignments as two opposing geopolitical blocs obscures the reality that many states support, engage with, or profit from both sides simultaneously. (Craze, 2025). Turkey, for instance, supplies drones to the SAF even while cultivating ties with Haftar, whose forces have fought alongside the RSF; likewise, Russia collaborates with the RSF on gold mining while negotiating with the SAF for access to a Red Sea port. As Craze writes:
“The conflict in Sudan reveals itself not as a war for gold, in which countries align on one side or the other: but rather a configuration in which war is a necessary condition for the maintenance of a regional political economy partly predicated on gold.” (Craze, 2025).
The UAE’s involvement in Sudan spans over a decade. For example, in 2015, Bashir’s government deployed RSF fighters to Yemen under UAE direction, with Hemedti receiving weapons, logistical support, and diplomatic cover in return (Mahjoub, 2025). The December 2018 Sudanese revolution, which ousted Bashir in April 2019, directly challenged the UAE’s regional ambitions. By 2023, when conflict erupted with the SAF, Hemedti’s forces already possessed the external financing and supply chains necessary for a sustained war. Since the early 2010s, the UAE has sought to expand its influence through investment, security partnerships, and informal patronage, with Sudan as a key example. Donelli (2025) argues that this approach operates on two levels: economically, by securing access to gold; and strategically, by projecting influence into the Sahel and Horn of Africa, competing with states such as Qatar, Turkey, and Iran for regional leverage. Arguably, these objectives are intertwined, as gold underpins the UAE’s broader strategy to assert power across the region and reinforce its position as a global logistics and maritime hub. Between 2012 and 2022, UAE imports of African gold more than doubled, from 243 to 609 tonnes, and by 2022, African gold worth $34.5 billion accounted for nearly 7% of the UAE’s GDP (Soliman and Baldo, 2025). Furthermore, key Sudanese banks, including the Bank of Khartoum and El-Nilein, rely on their UAE branches for international transactions, reinforcing Dubai’s central role in Sudan’s war economy (Craze, 2025). Despite modest improvements in Emirati regulation, such as the suspension of 32 refineries in 2024 for non-compliance, the UAE continues to profit from Sudan’s conflict gold, taking advantage of weak enforcement of restrictions on gold sourced from war zones or armed groups (Soliman and Baldo, 2025).
Indeed, all roads seem to lead to the UAE, even for the SAF. While it frequently criticises Emirati support for the RSF, the SAF remains heavily reliant on UAE financial infrastructure and commercial networks. In 2024, nearly all official gold exports from SAF-controlled areas—about 97 percent—were sent to the UAE, generating $1.52 billion in revenue (Soliman and Baldo, 2025). Egypt occupies a paradoxical role in Sudan’s war economy. While militarily supporting the SAF, Cairo has become a re-export hub for Sudanese gold, creating economic dependence on Emirati markets. Despite SAF efforts to divert gold away from Dubai, most of Sudan’s official exports still ultimately reach the UAE, ironically the same state backing the SAF’s rival.
At the diplomatic level, the UAE has sought to deflect accusations of complicity. At the UN Security Council meeting on 30 October 2025, Sudan’s Permanent Representative, Al-Harith Idriss, accused the UAE of waging a “war of aggression through its regional proxy, the RSF,” directly confronting Emirati representatives (Middle East Eye, 2025). Yet, despite mounting evidence, international sanctions against UAE-based entities have been limited (Mahjoub, 2025). Meanwhile, the humanitarian toll is staggering, Sudanese civilians have borne the brunt of the conflict. The UNHCR (2025) characterises Sudan as the world’s most severe displacement crisis, with over 12 million people forced from their homes. The UAE’s simultaneous role as a donor to UN relief efforts and a purchaser of conflict gold highlights the blurred boundaries between commerce and war in the twenty-first century.
Conclusion
Sudan’s war illustrates a complex global political economy of complicity in which conflict and commerce are deeply intertwined. Gold has emerged as a central resource for financing and sustaining the fighting, linking domestic actors like the SAF and RSF to regional powers such as Egypt and the UAE. These states, despite being allies, support opposing sides, shaping the war’s trajectory while benefiting economically and strategically from the trade. Encouraging Egypt and the UAE to align their regional policies, particularly regarding Sudan, could help mitigate these dynamics and reduce the conflict’s intensity. Sudan’s war economy persists not despite the international system but because of it, because the same networks that facilitate trade and investment also enable conflict financing. Policy responses must therefore target systems, not just actors. Ultimately, Sudan’s “blood gold” underscores the erosion of the boundaries between war and commerce. The country’s tragedy is inseparable from the global economy that profits from it. At the same time, efforts should recognise the livelihoods of millions dependent on artisanal gold mining, supporting safer and more sustainable extraction practices. Tackling Sudan’s crisis calls for coordinated international efforts, sensitive engagement with regional actors, and a fresh look at the ways global economic and political systems can unintentionally fuel conflict.
References
European Union Institute for Security Studies. (2025). The fall of El-Fasher: Sudan’s war outpaces truce plan. [online] Available at: https://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/commentary/fall-el-fasher-sudans-war-outpaces-truce-plan.
ISPI. (2025). Sudan’s Civil War and the Gulf Chessboard. [online] Available at: https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/sudans-civil-war-and-the-gulf-chessboard-207431.
HUMAN SECURITY EMERGENCY Day Two of RSF Control: Mass Killings Continue in El-Fasher. (2025). [online] Available at: https://files-profile.medicine.yale.edu/documents/b9c14991-6b22-492e-9e16-f903d25d9b49.
Soliman, A. and Baldo, S. (2025). Gold and the war in Sudan. [online] Available at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2025-03/2025-03-25-gold-and-the-war-in-sudan-soliman-and-baldo.pdf.
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