On January 9, 2026, the US announced the release of a $45 million USD aid package to fulfil their commitment to fostering regional peace and stability, especially to ease the unrest caused by the Thai-Cambodia border conflicts. The package will be allocated to support the displaced population, to carry out demining and the clearance of unexploded ordnance, and to combat transnational crime issues in Cambodia and Thailand, such as scam operations and drug trafficking.
The aid is a continuation of the US attempt to fortify their position as a governing force in the Indo-Pacific. Since the Trump Administration took office, their ‘America First’ policies have brought concerns among its partners, particularly the ones in East Asia that are dependent on their ties in defence, security and military cooperation. Among others, South Korea and Japan have made their discontent known following US demands to raise their defence spending.
Despite the demands, East Asian powers have more leeway on their partnership with the US, whereas the South East Asian actors such as Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, which rely on the US’s support in not only security and military protection but also social and economic developments, face more devastating consequences when the Trump Administration halted US foreign aid funds in January 2025. That decision led to hedging states, such as Cambodia, to seek alternative partners to assist with humanitarian crises. As part of the long-standing joint demining project, China, in February 2025, replaced the US after their aid freeze, and provided $4.4 million for Cambodian Mine Action Center’s (CMAC) mine clearance. The isolationist US policies also affected its ties with Thailand, its ally, pushing the kingdom to pursue closer cooperation with China to boost its economic and political goals. According to ASEAN Briefing, China has become the largest foreign investor in Thailand in 2023. Moreover, China has surpassed the US in arms sales to Thailand in value since 2016.
To address the fallout caused by the aid freeze and the shift of geopolitical dynamics, the US has sought to reaffirm their interests in maintaining ties with regional powers. During the 16th Meeting of the ASEAN-US Joint Cooperation Committee on May 9, 2025, the US reviewed the progress of the Plan of Action to Implement the ASEAN-US Strategic Partnership (2021-25) and proposed the ASEAN-US Leaders’ Joint Vision Statement that would advance the partnership beyond 2025. It was later reflected in the 47th ASEAN Summit on October 26, where the US and Malaysia brokered the Kuala Lumpur Peace Accord, pushing mutual military de-escalation, ceasefire and confidence-building. The peace accord was then halted as the detonation of a landmine injured a Thai soldier in November, however, Thailand and Cambodia would later, on December 27, reach a consensus on the incident being accidental and agreed to continue the commitment to peace. Right after the second truce, China guaranteed a $2.5 million humanitarian aid to Cambodia and as a response, the US issued the $45 million package mentioned above.
The US aid package which includes funds to combat drug-trafficking and scam programmes could serve as an initiative for the continuation of PoA (2021-2025), specifically Priority Area 1.3, Transnational Crime and Counter Terrorism. And as we step into 2026, it is likely that the US will be willing to loosen more of their restrictions on funds to counterbalance China’s rising soft power in the Indo-Pacific, whilst maintaining their credibility to allies as shown in the case of Thai-Cambodia conflict.
Recommended Further Reading:
- Kanodia (2025): https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/07/us-indo-pacific-allies-are-unhappy-about-trumps-defence-demands-they-have-comply
- ASEAN (2025): https://asean.org/asean-united-states-continue-to-further-strengthen-comprehensive-strategic-partnership/
- Sato and Yaacob (2023): https://thediplomat.com/2023/12/is-china-replacing-the-us-as-thailands-main-security-partner/
Written by Benjamin Questin Wu
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author(s) and do not represent the views or positions of CISES, its leadership or affiliated organisation(s)