Executive Summary
The expiration of New START (Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty) on 5 February 2026 presents risks and opportunities for the US and Russia alike. The bilateral treaty reflected US–Russia cooperation, later reshaped by the Ukraine War and Chinese nuclearisation. The result is a strategic environment defined by geopolitical uncertainty and fierce competition.
Key Facts & Figures
– Signed in April 2010 and enacted in February 2011 under Obama, New START held a total period of 10 years. In February 2021, a mutual agreement between US President Joe Biden and Russian President Vladimir Putin led to a 5-year extension.
– New START caps each state at 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads, 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles — including ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers — and 800 total launchers.
Background/Context
The expiration of the 1991 START Treaty in December 2009 prompted the negotiation of a new agreement between the US and Russia. The shared commitment to arms control acted as signalling, establishing a stabilising mechanism in diplomatic relations. Unlike START, which imposed sub-limits, New START adopted more flexible aggregate caps. The new treaty also addressed the Moscow Treaty’s weak verification framework. New START reintroduced legally binding transparency and inspection regimes: on-site inspections, data exchanges, and the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC). The agreement was criticised for overlooking Russia’s large arsenal of short- and intermediate missiles and overly benefiting Moscow. During COVID-19, the US and Russia mutually agreed to suspend on-site inspections and BCC meetings. In February 2023, Putin announced the country’s suspension of New START, citing US support for Ukraine and Western hostility. While Russia stopped adhering to New START’s verification provisions, it committed to the treaty’s central limits.
Current Status and Future Status
Inspections, data exchanges, and notifications are key stabilising features. While both sides have continued to observe numerical limits, confidence in compliance has eroded in the absence of verification commitments. The US has formally found Russia in violation of multiple arms control agreements, fuelling doubt about informal assurances. Further, new Russian systems (the Burevestnik or the Poseidon intercontinental missiles) are not covered by the treaty. On 9 January 2026, Russia launched an Oreshnik missile into Lviv, Ukraine. This intermediate-range ballistic missile (MIRV) is designed to carry nuclear payloads and is neglected by New START. Russia’s emboldened military stance and the loss of information-sharing measures fuel worst-case scenario planning that sustains arms race dynamics. This development mirrors a standoffish US posture regarding past inter-governmental treaties, with President Donald Trump recently exiting 66 international commitments.
6 February 2026 will end any formal restrictions on the strategic nuclear forces of the US and Russia in 54 years. Although Putin proposed to continue observing New START limits, the US did not respond. Viewing New START as a reassurance framework informs a more unpredictable nuclear relationship and vulnerable future multilateral efforts. Others argue that New START was always in Russia’s interests: Russia cannot sustain an unconstrained arms race. A New START successor would enable Moscow to focus its resources on Ukraine and signal tolerance for Russian non-compliance. The US must also define its strategy towards the nuclear environment created by China’s rapid buildup. China is projected to reach a stockpile of 1,000 warheads by 2030, prompting calls to include China in New START’s successor. For Europe, urging nuclear talks would provide an opportunity to advance its priorities instead of relying on US decisions. The Spring 2026 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference is expected to clarify these questions in a climate of nuclear armament.
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