Introduction
China is rapidly transforming its “minimum deterrent” into a larger, more survivable and versatile nuclear force that can operate on land, at sea, and in the air. In January 2025, SIPRI assessed that China had “at least 600” warheads in its stockpile. This was about 100 more than the year before and the fastest growth rate among the nuclear powers. The same study also found that about 350 new ICBM silos were being built or were almost finished. This constitutes material evidence of a long-term structural expansion from the small force that existed in the early 2000s. The US Department of Defense’s (now known as the Department of War) 2024 report stated that China had “more than 600” operational warheads as of mid-2024 and expected “over 1,000” by 2030, with growth continuing into the 2030s. These figures indicate a shift: they show a change in the quality of the force’s posture, readiness options, and penetration capabilities, all of which are set up to work in a world where missile defences are getting better, hypersonic flight is becoming more common, and space is becoming more contested.
Strategic Drivers and Doctrinal Evolution
The reasons for this change are a mix of strategic apprehension and technological chance. Beijing has long had a No-First-Use (NFU) policy and stressed assured retaliation. However, its modernisation suggests a shift towards “assured retaliation with options”: more platforms kept at higher states of readiness, more basing modes to make pre-emption harder, and more tools—multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), decoys, manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles, and possibly hypersonic glide vehicles—to break through layered defences. The discovery and tracking of several large silo fields in the north and west show this desire to make things harder for the defender and to make things more survivable. The DF-41 (CSS-20) is the most important part of this plan. It is a solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that can be based on roads or in silos and has the potential to carry multiple warheads. When combined with new silos, it turns a small, mobile-heavy force into one with both depth and redundancy. Open-source technical assessments, despite inherent limitations, converge on the view that DF-41 is meant to carry multiple warheads to intercontinental ranges and is being integrated across different basing modes.
Building the Nuclear Triad: Land, Sea, and Air Integration
If the land leg is the backbone, the sea leg is the test of whether a deterrent can really work. China’s Jin-class (Type 094) ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) have given them the ability to strike back, but the noise they make limits their range of operation. The next-generation Type 096 platform and the JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) are expected to bring about the real change. The DoD’s 2024 report says that the Type 096 is “probably intended to field multiple independently targetable reentry Vehicle submarine-launched ballistic missiles (MIRVed SLBMs).” This fits with other evidence that the JL-3 is meant to increase its range, decrease its patrol exposure, and allow bastion operations closer to Chinese waters while still threatening continental targets. The open-source record on JL-3 is necessarily ambiguous, but successive CSIS “Missile Threat” entries, DoD commentary and specialist reporting converge on a picture of an SLBM with greater range and payload flexibility than the JL-2, designed to underpin continuous at-sea deterrence in the 2030s. The sea leg will be the hardest for an enemy to neutralise in a crisis, if China fields longer-range missiles, quieter submarines, crews that are better, and command-and-control systems that are more resilient.
Similarly, the air leg is re-emerging as an operational component. The H-6 family of planes from the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is still changing, and the H-6N variant, which has a recessed centreline station and can refuel in flight, has been seen carrying a large air-launched ballistic missile that is often called CH-AS-X-13 or KD-21. According to Pentagon comments and detailed trade-press analysis, the system is dual-capable and could include a manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle. If this is the case, it gives China a nuclear-capable standoff option that presents defenders with a compressed-timeline threat from many different directions. The H-20 stealth bomber, which has a flying wing and can fly long distances, would complete the formal triad. However, credible assessments warn that while development seems to be real, it will take years to train a force with mature low-observable sustainment, mission avionics, and tanker integration. There have been rumours of early flight activity, but as of October 2025, there is no official confirmation of an operational debut. In short, the air leg is real and getting stronger; the most important part is still to come.
Hypersonic, Space, and the Expansion of Cross-Domain Deterrence
Hypersonic systems speed up this change. In 2021, it was reported that China tested a hypersonic glide vehicle that could carry nuclear weapons. It travelled through low-orbit space and circled the globe before coming back down, which is similar to how a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) works. Even without regular nuclear pairing, these paths make warning systems harder to use and get around fixed defensive geometries by coming from unexpected angles. The DF-17’s presence in the region, along with research into air-breathing hypersonic weapons, shows that this is a growing trend. Open sources are careful not to overstate the routine nuclear loadouts on these systems, but enemies should also assume that nuclear weapons are possible and plan accordingly. Both sides of the Pacific have already planned for the strategic effect of that uncertainty, which is that there is a higher risk of misunderstanding when there is a lot of pressure.
Space fills in the gaps—not so much by “putting nukes in orbit” as by allowing nuclear operations and threatening an enemy’s supporters. China’s space infrastructure helps nuclear forces with early warning, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), navigation (BeiDou), and secure communications. At the same time, a growing number of cyberspace tools can put those same functions at risk for other countries. The 2007 direct-ascent ASAT test against the FY-1C satellite is still important because of the debris it left behind and the message it sent about China’s ability and willingness to use kinetic space weapons. Since then, China has been looking into advanced on-orbit techniques and non-kinetic options. People often say that the Shijian-21 mission’s docking with a dead satellite and towing it to a higher disposal orbit is a way to reduce space debris. However, rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO), docking, and manoeuvring capabilities are all examples of dual-use technology. The Space Threat Assessment (2024, 2025) from CSIS talks about China’s satellites that can move around a lot and the growing ability to have effects in space. In a crisis, messing with early-warning or nuclear command-and-control satellites could be seen as a sign of a first strike, which makes space a place where misunderstandings can lead to more violence.
Global and Regional Responses and the Emerging Tripolar Nuclear Order
China’s rise as a full-spectrum nuclear peer (along with Russia) changes the way the US thinks about deterrence from two countries to three. Washington is putting more resources into its own triad, but the realities of the industrial base and programme get in the way. The B-21 Raider is currently testing flight with several airframes, which is a very important step for the penetrating bomber leg. The Columbia-class SSBN is still the Navy’s top priority, even though reports from Congress and the Navy itself say that the schedule is tight. The Sentinel ICBM programme has the most serious problems. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Department of Defence have both said that costs have gone up significantly (about 81% more than initial estimates) and schedules have been pushed back significantly. This has led to Nunn-McCurdy breach processes and the need to rely on the Minuteman III for a long time, until the 2030s. These stresses do not stop the US from deterring others, but they do make it more expensive and fragile to manage a two-peer environment, especially since modernisation must also include strong nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) and space architectures.
India is closing the loop on a triad tailored to deal with its problem with China. The “Mission Divyastra” test of an MIRV-capable Agni-5 in New Delhi on March 11, 2024, was clearly meant to show that multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles work. This indicates an Indian emphasis on penetration capability and targeting flexibility against hardened, distributed assets. The K-4 SLBM and the Arihant-class SSBNs are also making progress, which makes sea-based deterrence stronger. India’s doctrine and readiness cycles differ significantly from China’s, but the action–reaction dynamic is clear: Chinese force expansion prompts Indian responses, which in turn shape China’s planning. Japan is officially non-nuclear, but it is changing its stance to include “counterstrike” capabilities. Tokyo’s decision in January 2024 to buy 400 Tomahawk cruise missiles from the US, speed up deployment schedules, and invest in two huge Aegis System Equipped Vessels with advanced SPY-7 radars are all examples of a layered approach to both strike and missile defence, with China clearly in mind.
Economic capacity supports these changes.. According to SIPRI, China spent about $296 billion on its military in 2023 and about $314 billion in 2024. This is part of a trend that has been going on for 30 years. The AP reports that the public defence budget for 2025 is around $245 billion, but this is because of different accounting methods and timing. A well-known peer-reviewed study by Fravel, Gilboy, and Heginbotham says that when you take into account off-budget items and sector-specific purchasing power, China’s effective defence spending in 2024 may be closer to $471 billion. This is a lot more than the headline budget but still less than some inflated claims. The exact number isn’t as important as the direction: China has the industrial depth, financial resources, and political priorities to keep modernising on a large scale. This context helps us understand how silo fields, new SSBNs, hypersonic research, and growing space constellations can all move forward at the same time.
China’s modernisation effort is not without friction. As the force expands in size and complexity, greater emphasis is required on safety culture, command discipline, and doctrinal clarity. This is particularly acute where dual-capable systems introduce ambiguity. Forms of opacity that once generated strategic uncertainty now increase the risk of misinterpretation. The lack of clarity that used to create uncertainty now makes it more likely that people will get the wrong idea. For instance, if the enemy cannot quickly tell the difference between the payloads of a DF-26 or an H-6-launched ballistic missile, they might think it was a nuclear strike. If space assets that are used for nuclear warning are interfered with, it could be seen as a sign of an attack to disarm. The 2021 alleged FOBS-like test shows how new trajectories can put a lot of stress on early warning and decision-making in ways that have never happened before. Managing these risks requires robust crisis-communication mechanisms and, where feasible, new arms-control ‘guardrails’ adapted to a tripolar environment and cross-domain entanglement. Near-term measures could include commitments to refrain from debris-generating anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) tests, the establishment of space-related hotlines and incident-prevention protocols, and test-notification arrangements for hypersonic and FOBS-like systems.
How others see China’s path affects stability. In Washington, it is not just the numbers that scare them; it’s the coercive leverage as well. By the 2030s, a China with a survivable, MIRV-heavy triad and hypersonic/space options could make US extended deterrence in Asia harder and limit crisis options around Taiwan or the South and East China Seas. In New Delhi and Tokyo, analysts are worried about time-compressed coercion in the same way. This has led to investments in stronger bases, long-range standoff fires, and better missile defences. Even Russia, China’s strategic partner, will be keeping an eye on what a much stronger Chinese triad means for the future. Moscow benefits from the rivalry between China and the US today, and its own arsenal size and quantity are still much bigger. However, Moscow planners cannot ignore the fact that another “great power” could get strong, MIRV-capable ICBMs and SSBNs that could threaten Russian targets. This could either just cause hedging or turn into more serious military-strategic caution, depending on how quickly and how much China’s numbers and readiness grow.
Conclusion
The most important debate is that China is certainly making an effective nuclear trident. Silo fields and mobile ICBMs like the DF-41 make it easier for missiles to survive and launch more missiles at once. Type 096 and JL-3 promise to make a small fleet of SSBNs into a real deterrent at sea. H-6N/ALBM combinations give us flexibility in the air right now, but the H-20 is a big step forward for the future. Hypersonic delivery options are being added to the larger deterrent grammar, and space power—both enabling and counterspace—has become a part of nuclear planning. This change is possible because the economy can keep making military investments and the organisation is set up to work towards long-term military-industrial goals. The US and important players in the region are already making changes. They are modernising their own forces, putting money into missile defence and strike, and working together to prepare for a more complicated nuclear situation.
Doctrine, signalling, and governance will determine whether the new order becomes stable or unstable. A bigger stockpile of weapons in China does not necessarily mean that war is more likely. In theory, a survivable triad can lower the need for “use-or-lose” decision-making. But in real life, tri-polarity, unclear dual-capable systems, hypersonic timelines, and space entanglement make it even more important to be open and handle crises well. Crisis situations will be more fragile than they need to be if there aren’t reliable ways to separate conventional and nuclear signalling and protect the core functions of nuclear command-and-control in space. China’s quest for a balanced triad is both comprehensible and significant: comprehensible as a reaction to perceived weaknesses and aspirations for great-power status; significant because it will compel others to invest, innovate, and assume risks in areas where the margin for error is diminishing.
Written by Dr Tahir Azad, Associate Fellow at CISES.