Western reporting on the protests in Iran has been dominated by outrage at the brutality of the authorities, who – not for the first time – have shown little hesitation in resorting to violent repression to quell social unrest. Some Western politicians have also expressed the rather difficult-to-fulfil hope that the protests might lead to the collapse of the Ayatollahs’ regime. Against this backdrop, it is worth examining how Russia assesses the situation in Iran and, above all, how important Iran actually is to contemporary Russian foreign policy.
The official position of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggests that Moscow is broadly satisfied with developments in Iran, particularly with the authorities’ success in restoring control and suppressing social protests. At the same time, Russian government sources imply that the escalation of tensions in Iran may be linked to external interference, primarily by the United States and Israel, and may be aimed at regime change. However, this does not mean that Russia possesses any real means of intervening in Iran to preserve the political status quo, even if such an outcome would be advantageous from Moscow’s perspective. To understand this, several factors must be taken into account.
‘Comprehensive strategic partnership’ is a slogan without real substance
Iran occupies only a marginal place in Russian strategic documents. The 2023 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation lists the development of comprehensive cooperation with Iran as an objective, placing it alongside relations with other regional actors such as Syria (under the Assad regime), Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. Russia also declares its intention to support efforts aimed at normalising Iran’s relations with Arab states, without specifying the nature of such actions. The 2021 National Security Strategy omits Iran altogether, referring only in very general terms to the Middle East.
At first glance, the treaty on ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ signed by Russia and Iran on 17 January 2025 might suggest that Iran is more important to Moscow. In reality, however, the agreement remains highly declarative. It refers in vague terms to cooperation in information exchange and military-technical collaboration, but contains no concrete commitments. Even in the event of a military threat, both sides merely pledge not to provide military or other assistance to an aggressor. There are no mutual defence obligations.
The consequences of the fall of the Assad regime in Syria further illustrate the superficial nature of this so-called strategic partnership. During the Syrian civil war, Russia cooperated with Iran in order to keep Assad in power and to maintain joint influence in the region, including in coordination with Türkiye. However, Assad’s defeat, despite support from both Moscow and Tehran, exposed the divergence of Russian and Iranian interests. While Iran suffered a serious strategic setback in Syria and faces uncertainty regarding relations with the new authorities in Damascus, Russia has sought to pursue a pragmatic course, signalling its willingness to cooperate with the new government in order to preserve, at least in part, its military presence in the country.
Iran is not part of Russia’s sphere of influence
Contrary to opinions sometimes expressed in public discourse, Iran does not belong to Russia’s sphere of influence in the way Syria did under Bashar al-Assad. Iran aspires to the role of a regional power and, to this end, has developed its own military potential and capabilities for intervention beyond its borders. The failure of Iranian policy in Syria and the significant losses suffered during the war with Israel in June 2025 demonstrated that this potential is limited. Nevertheless, Iranian foreign policy remains largely independent of Russia.
Although Iran cooperates with Russia within international organisations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and other multilateral formats, including BRICS, cooperation with China is far more important and promising for Tehran, both economically and militarily. Moreover, despite references to military-technical cooperation in the 2025 strategic partnership agreement, Russia has been unable, since the start of its war against Ukraine in 2022, to meet Iran’s needs in terms of weapons and advanced military equipment. As a result, China is increasingly replacing Russia as Iran’s key external partner in this area.
The war in Ukraine has also revealed that, contrary to earlier assumptions in Moscow, it is Russia that has become dependent on Iran, particularly with regard to drone technology. Iran has supplied Shahed drones (referred to in Russia as Geran), which have been widely used by Russian forces against Ukraine, including against civilian targets and infrastructure. Moreover, Iran has transferred the technology necessary for the domestic production of these drones in Russia, mainly at a large facility in the Alabuga special economic zone in Tatarstan.
Russia’s growing dependence on Iran is also evident in other sectors. Attempts to use Iranian facilities to service Western-made civilian aircraft operated by Russian airlines have proved unsuccessful, while imports of Iranian cars and spare parts have increased in response to the crisis in the Russian automotive industry caused by Western sanctions.
Russia’s interest in Iran’s isolation and regional instability
It is in Russia’s interest for Iran to remain politically and economically isolated and to stay locked in confrontation with the United States and Israel. This, in turn, can best be guaranteed by maintaining the current regime in Iran. This interest has both economic and political dimensions.
Economically, Russia benefits from the continuation of Western sanctions on Iran, particularly in the energy sector. The Russian state budget is so heavily dependent on oil revenues that even the potential release of Venezuelan oil, after the arrest of Nicolás Maduro, is analysed in Moscow as a threat to national security, including Russia’s ability to finance the war against Ukraine and other military engagements. From this perspective, Russia has every incentive to ensure that Iran remains under sanctions, thereby limiting global oil supply and supporting higher prices.
Politically, Russia has a strong interest in destabilising a region of key importance to the United States, given Washington’s commitments to Israel and the Gulf states. Moscow seeks to tie down as many US resources as possible, including military assets, by sustaining a permanent zone of instability around Iran, encompassing the risk of war and terrorism. According to a public statement by Russian Defence Minister Andrei Belousov in December 2024, Russia is preparing for war with NATO in Europe within the next decade. In this context, any developments that weaken NATO or generate additional centres of instability outside Europe serve Russian strategic interests. Supporting Iran as a source of regional destabilisation forms part of a broader Russian strategy aimed at reshaping the post-Cold War order in Europe through confrontation with the West.
Written by Professor Marcin Składanowski, a Fellow at CISES and Full Professor of Russian and International Security Studies at the Catholic University of Lublin, Poland.