High-energy weapons (HEWs), especially high-energy lasers (HELs) and high-power microwave (HPM) systems, are moving from being “future tech” to being useful for defending air bases and fighting drones. The important question for South Asia is not whether lasers can burn through tough bunkers (they generally cannot), but whether HEWs can change how India and Pakistan protect, investigate, and understand each other’s most important infrastructure, including the systems that keep nuclear weapons from being used. The outcome is a novel nuclear security dilemma: measures designed for defence (counter-unmanned aerial system protection, perimeter security) may be perceived as offensive (sensor blinding, C2 degradation), exacerbating pessimistic assumptions in a rivalry characterised by limited warning time and trust.
Why HEWs matter for nuclear safety and security:
HEWs are important because they target the various areas of modern militaries that make them work, like sensors, communications, electronics, and networks that need power. This enabling layer is critical for nuclear safety and security because it helps prevent unauthorised access and makes sure that command, control, and communications are always reliable. HEWs can have low-signature and sometimes reversible effects, like dazzling sensors, degrading electronics, or disabling drones, without leaving the clear “signature” of a missile impact. This is different from kinetic strikes. In a nuclear context, that uncertainty is destabilising. When a radar goes offline or a surveillance feed drops during a crisis, it could be seen as a technical failure, cyber interference, or a deliberate electromagnetic attack.
The U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS) gets to the core of the issue: directed-energy weapons are being made for short-range air defence (SHORAD), counter-UAS, and counter-rocket/artillery/mortar (C-RAM) missions, while High-Power Microwave (HPM) systems are meant to disrupt electronics on a large scale. For India and Pakistan, these missions are directly related to protecting (and fighting over) air bases, strategic depots, radar nodes, and communications infrastructure. Many of these are dual-use, which means they are also used for nuclear operations.
India’s visible lead: from demonstration to integration
India has made sufficient advancement in HEWs, and open-source data reveals this progress in HELs. In April 2025, DRDO made a public announcement that the Mk-II(A) Laser Directed Energy Weapon (DEW) system had successfully passed a test at the National Open-Air Range (NOAR) in Kurnool. The release says that the system can hit aerial targets, like drones, and frames the test as proof that India has joined an “exclusive” group of countries with high-power laser DEW capabilities.
The important thing for nuclear security is not the exact kilowatt rating that is being talked about in the news, but the operational logic: Counter-UAS lasers are cheap and quick ways to deal with drones that might otherwise spy on or disrupt sensitive sites. Drones are now the tool of choice for ‘grey zone’ pressure because they are cheap, can be used in large numbers, and can be denied with little effort. Lasers can help lessen that advantage at the edge if they are reliably linked to detection and tracking.
India’s second big sign is that it does not see lasers as a separate standalone capability. India’s Press Information Bureau reported on the first flight test of the Integrated Air Defence Weapon System (IADWS) in August 2025. They made it clear that the system has multiple layers and includes missiles and a high-power laser-based directed energy weapon. That is a significant form of institutional commitment; it shows that India is trying to fit HELs into a larger system that includes sensors, battle management, and several layers of interception.
This is crucial because layered air defence is also layered signalling. If India can credibly protect valuable assets from drones and small projectiles, it makes it harder for the enemy to gather information and launch limited attacks. Moreover, it also makes Pakistan less sure that India is gaining a better advantage in information dominance and early action, especially if HEWs are used with electronic warfare, cyber operations, and quick ISR-to-strike cycles. In a nuclearised rivalry, states may feel like they have an edge in seeing and disabling, which can lead to pre-emption or, more often, to hasty readiness measures that make it harder to control crises.
Pakistan: interest, selective acquisition, and an EW-heavy pathway
It is harder to confirm Pakistan’s HEW stance through official public records. That limitation should be considered as a finding in itself: lack of clarity raises the risk of misunderstanding. However, there are still credible reasons to believe that Pakistan is interested in Chinese laser systems and that they are likely to buy them.
The South China Morning Post reported in September 2025 that Pakistan was “eyeing Chinese laser weapons.” They quoted a former high-ranking Pakistani naval officer who talked about how high-energy directed weapons were becoming more popular and how Pakistan wanted to ‘integrate’ with China in this area. This fits with the bigger picture of Pakistan modernising through Chinese platforms, co-production, and technology transfers in some areas.
For nuclear security, the most likely short-term use for any Pakistani laser acquisition would be to protect a small number of high-value sites, like air bases, command nodes, and other strategic locations, rather than to be used all over the country. If Pakistan cannot match India’s institutional and industrial base for developing HELs on its own, it can still try to keep things even at key points. That plan might make it harder for drones to penetrate the facility, but it does not fix the underlying stability issue: during a crisis, each side might see the other side’s protective upgrades as a sign of offensive intent or preparation.
Pakistan’s other likely comparative advantage is not HELs but electronic warfare (EW) and ‘soft kill’ methods for dealing with drones and messing up communications. Even though EW and HPM weapons are not the same, they both have the same strategic goal: to keep the enemy from being able to sense and coordinate. The problem is that escalation is unclear. If electronic disruption happens near nodes that an enemy thinks are related to strategic operations, it can be seen as an attack on nuclear command and control, even if that was not the goal.
The nuclear security dilemma in practice: three pathways to instability
HEWs make things less stable, not so much by their raw destructive power, but by how they redesign perceptions of vulnerability and intent.
- ‘Disable rather than destroy’ operations are easier to justify—and easier to misread: A laser that blinds sensors or destroys a drone can be seen as a way to protect yourself. A microwave-like effect that disrupts electronics can be seen as short-lived. But in a crisis, even short-term disruptions can be seen as signs of bigger strikes to come. It is even harder to figure out what electromagnetic effects are in real time, which increases ambiguity.
- HEWs deepen conventional–nuclear entanglement: Many of the assets that HEWs want to hit, like radars, air bases, and communications relays, can be used for more than one purpose. An attack that is meant to give one side an advantage can look like an attempt to weaken strategic warning or control. This makes it easy for things to get out of hand quickly because of misunderstandings instead of intentional choices.
- HEWs compress decision time by undermining information confidence: Part of deterrence stability is psychological: leaders need to be sure they can see enough and talk to each other enough to avoid making big mistakes. When sensing and communications become contestable at the margins through low-signature effects, decision-makers face pressure to “act before going blind”, raising the risk of hasty moves.
What countermeasures look like—and where the weak points remain
- India and Pakistan both have reasonable ways to mitigate the risks associated with HEWs:
- Making strategic electronics (especially C2 and site security systems) stronger and safer, including surge protection and EM resilience measures.
- Redundancy in communications, such as having more than one way to communicate, backup nodes, and mobile command posts.
- Dispersion and deception to reduce the payoff of sensor-blinding or drone surveillance.
- A layered defence that uses detection, jamming, lasers, and kinetic interceptors to match the threat spectrum instead of betting on just one “solution”.
However, the hardest thing is not engineering; it is governance and signalling. There are no South Asian standards or ways to lower risk that are specific to HEWs who work near nuclear-relevant infrastructure. That omission is key because HEWs are particularly effective in grey-zone contexts. Without channels to communicate with each other and shared understanding, normal defensive actions like shooting down a drone, jamming a link, or dazzling a sensor can lead to escalation.
A stabilisation agenda for a high-energy age:
South Asia should comprehend HEWs as an ambiguity amplifier and respond with a mix of strength and lowering risk.
- First, protect C2, which is important to nuclear weapons. Put electromagnetic hardening and redundancy at the top of your list for the systems that make safe control and crisis communication possible.
- Make “rules of the road” for drones and electronic effects near sensitive areas during a crisis. Track II-backed informal agreements can help avoid misunderstandings.
- Invest in diagnostics and attribution capacity. The less likely it is for a state to escalate from uncertainty, the faster it can tell the difference between an attack and a fault.
- Avoid conflating point defence with counterforce signalling. States can use counter-UAS lasers while still showing restraint, but only if they set up reliable ways to improve situational awareness in a crisis.
It is clear that HEWs cannot replace nuclear deterrence, but they can make it harder to manage deterrence. In South Asia’s geography and politics, the biggest HEW risk is not big destruction but the slow buildup of confusion about who can see, who can hide, and who is losing control. Managing that ambiguity is a key part of nuclear security now.
Written by Dr Tahir Azad, Associate Fellow at CISES and Research Fellow at the University of Reading.