On 17th January 2026, at 5.44am, China reportedly launched a drone incursion into Taiwanese-controlled airspace above Pratas island in the South China Sea. Despite previous drone appearances, this is the first time Beijing has publicly claimed the drone as its own, describing its operation as “routine training”. Pratas sits just west of the Bashi Channel, a key maritime passage, between Taiwan and the Philippines, that connects the South China Sea to the Pacific Ocean. Control over this space is crucial, potentially enabling the Chinese to block naval access to the South China Sea.
This event forms part of a broader intensification of China’s intimidation tactics as the post-1945 rules-based order comes under significant strain. Last month, the PLA conducted military exercises that crossed into Taiwan’s claimed territorial waters. At present, China has 12 oil rigs within Taiwan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) which, under the guise of resource extraction, may also function as relay stations for drone communications and surveillance. Such actions exemplify a strategy built around small, repetitive moves that ultimately contribute to a larger objective. Taiwan is however constrained in disputing this encroachment as it is not a UN member.
Moreover, it is not believed that the US would come to Taiwan’s aid in the event of a move against Pratas. While administered by Taiwan, the island lies outside Taiwan’s recognised maritime zone under UNCLOS. Instead, it forms part of contested territory inherited from the Republic of China’s pre-war claims in the South China Sea, not explicitly covered by the Taiwan Relations Act. Although the widespread belief is that the US would come to Taiwan’s aid in the event of a full-scale invasion, such ambiguity surrounding outlying territories may provide Beijing with a potential way-in, similar to Putin’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, which failed to provoke sufficiently severe repercussions at the time.
Drone incursions offer aggressors valuable foresight should they choose to escalate, while simultaneously instilling fear. Their unmanned and relatively inexpensive nature enables states to probe response thresholds and alliance strength with minimal risk. Over time, grey-zone activity can diminish threat awareness by blurring distinctions between signalling and imminent attack; Russia’s repeated use of incursions across Europe suggests Moscow has assessed their actions as net gains.
Pratas’s vulnerability makes it a particularly attractive testing ground. The island is only lightly defended, with a Coast Guard and rotational marine presence. The drone flew at an altitude beyond its air-defence system, which is largely short-range, leaving Taiwan scrambling crewed pilots from the mainland. China’s choice to target Pratas was therefore unlikely to be accidental, with the PLA choosing not to fly over Taiwanese military camps in the area, which would have risked a stronger retaliation. To address these gaps, Taiwan’s military is now discussing bolstering air defences on the island, such as the deployment of longer-range systems like the Tien Chien 2N surface-to-air missile and high-power jamming capabilities to disrupt any drone activity.
The Pratas Islands are largely uninhabited and lie closer to Hong Kong than to mainland Taiwan. Roughly 730km away from the United States’ closest military base in Okinawa, they are also highly exposed. By seizing Pratas, Beijing could deliver a significant blow to Taipei without immediately triggering a direct confrontation with Washington. In addition, it would put China in a much more strategically advantageous position from which to launch further attacks.
Diana Choyleva, a specialist in Chinese political forecasting, argues that Beijing is more likely to pursue a strategy of sustained pressure, aimed at “eroding Taiwan’s will to resist”, rather than a sudden invasion. The Pratas drone incursion, coupled with China’s claim of responsibility, points toward this strategy. Taiwan, meanwhile, will be hoping it can place complete faith in its US ally, regardless of which side of the aisle holds power.
Written by Aleksandra Tiso
Recommended Further Readings
https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2026/01/19/2003850840
https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-january-23-2026
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2026/01/18/asia-pacific/taiwan-china-drone-pratas