Upon NATO’s formation, Lord Ismay proclaimed that the Alliance’s function was to “keep the Americans in, the Germans down and the Russians out”. Nearly 80 years later, the transatlantic relationship appears beleaguered and fragmented as diplomatic rows between Trump and European allies over Greenland continue. A perceived lack of commitment to the rules-based international order, once guarded by American hegemony, has renewed pleas for European strategic autonomy. Thus, NATO stands at a historical inflexion point, one where the Euro-American relationship must be either reimagined or firmly altered, but Europe risks division over competing visions for continental security and strategic realities. As such, it is imperative to understand the current dynamics of the Alliance and set out the structure for a reimagined relationship within NATO.
On the one hand, nations such as France, which, since De Gaulle, have consistently cautioned against reliance on America, see now as an opportunity to champion their Pan-European vision for continental defence. Whilst others, such as Germany and the Netherlands, are less keen to reduce the US role. In recent weeks, France has successfully lobbied that as part of the €90 billion EU loan to Ukraine, EU defence manufacturers will be prioritised, meaning that US firms cannot be purchased from unless there is no credible European alternative. In response, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte stated in front of the European Parliament’s defence and foreign affairs committee, “If anyone thinks here … that … Europe as a whole can defend itself without the U.S., keep on dreaming”.
Put bluntly, Rutte is correct. Europe is far too reliant on US capabilities and leadership within the Alliance, such that the role America has played in the Alliance for almost a century cannot easily be assumed by a coalition of European nations. Production-wise, approximately half of the top 25 global defence manufacturers sit in the United States, whilst American military capabilities cannot be swiftly replaced. European nations within NATO are incredibly reliant on US assets to conduct battlefield shaping operations such as SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defence) operations. Currently, Europe lacks a credible alternative to the US EA-18 G Growler, whose electronic jamming made the capture of Maduro seamless and can form a key part of any SEAD campaign. US assets are also relied on for air-to-air refuelling during these campaigns alongside standoff munitions (kinetic effectors that have greater range and can operate outside air defence engagement envelopes). Russia possesses a vast array of GBAD (Ground-Based Air Defence) systems that would provide credible opposition to any attempted SEAD campaign without dedicated munitions such as the AGM-88 HARM, which the US manufactures. Alternatives such as the UK’s SPEAR programme are in development; however, are extremely costly and are unlikely to be fully developed until the early 2030s. If American assets are in use elsewhere in the midst of a European crisis or if leaders are unwilling to aid European defence, a quick, decisive war against Russia will be incredibly difficult to prosecute. Ultimately, the failure of Russia or Ukraine to gain air superiority has partly contributed to a sluggish attritional conflict. Julian Werner notes correctly that a primary cause for the failure of the 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive was a lack of air dominance. Sustaining an attritional conflict as a democratic state is highly undesirable and no easy task. It will certainly be an outcome European states would be keen to avoid.
Aside from conventional capabilities, the nuclear dimension is also one Europe would need to strengthen without US support. Currently, the US provides the primary nuclear deterrent force within the organisation, with this being added to by the much smaller British and French deterrents. Compounding this is the fact that, unlike the US, neither forward stations its own nuclear weapons, and France is not a part of NATO’s nuclear planning group. A US withdrawal from Europe would firstly put pressure on the UK and France to expand their nuclear arsenals, considering tactical/sub-strategic sovereign options, whilst also leading to horizontal proliferation (new countries possessing nuclear weapons) or new nuclear sharing agreements between the UK, France and other states. Both latter options risk violating the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which aims to halt nuclear weapons proliferation. Not to mention that an increase in the British and French nuclear arsenals would also come with its fair share of costs and development time.
Finally, in the absence of the US as a leader, a coalition of European powers is likely to emerge and collaboratively undertake leadership of the Alliance. Yet, once again, this means that countries likely to assume such a task, for instance Britain, France, Germany and Poland, will have to wrestle with a massive increase in defence spending despite economic/political turmoil at home. They must also demonstrate that their commitments are iron-clad and credible to deter Russia, something which Europe has historically relied on the US to do.
With such reliance difficult to immediately replace, the solution is thus a reimagined relationship, not destroying the current structure of the Alliance. As demonstrated, European NATO partners are far too reliant on US leadership and capabilities within NATO to immediately assume leadership positions within the Alliance. Moreover, if certain states continue this rhetoric of European “strategic autonomy”, they risk a complete US disengagement from the region before they possess the requisite capabilities, and a split amongst themselves. What needs to take place is a gradual shift, one which necessitates acute statesmanship and diplomatic candour. A slow transition whereby European states assume greater responsibility for their security as part of the Alliance and reduce the financial and military burden on the US with demonstrable commitments, including reducing overreliance on US assets. Such a scenario requires US support as much as does European support and would ensure that an amicable relationship is maintained, whilst the European security architecture remains firmly intact. The US is still a key partner to Europe; the structure of this partnership merely requires remodelling.
Written by Baaz Chandwan
Recommended Further Reading:
(Brattberg, 2025)- https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/insights-papers/impact-evolving-threat-perceptions-transatlantic-alliance
(Kayalli, Fritz, Weber and Lunday, 2025) – https://www.politico.eu/article/how-eu-fill-us-america-hole-nato-donald-trump-hague-uk-france-germany-poland/