Who Will Guarantee Europe’s Security?

Decades of reliance on the transatlantic alliance have shaped Europe’s security thinking around the United States. The start of Donald Trump’s second administration has brought obvious shifts in US rhetoric and policy, raising doubts about the strength and depth of American security commitments to Europe.

Diverging responses reflect European unease. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has emphasised the continued importance of the US security partnership, arguing “If anyone thinks here that the European Union or Europe as a whole can defend itself without the US, keep on dreaming.” Jean-Noël Barrot, the French Europe and Foreign Affairs minister, has instead argued that recent developments leave Europe with little choice. Barrot wrote, “No, dear Mark Rutte. Europeans can and must take charge of their own security”.

Rutte argues that US pressure to spend more on defence has strengthened Europe. Critics argue this logic overlooks an important contradiction: while European states have indeed increased defence budgets, they are dissuaded from pursuing their own strategic autonomy, directing much of this expenditure towards American equipment which only further reinforces dependence.

The Trump Administration’s rhetoric has catalysed renewed discussions about replacing the 100,000 American troops stationed in Europe. The EU Defence Commissioner has proposed the creation of a European army of a similar size. More recently, proposals for a European Security Council including France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Poland and two rotating members has gained traction.

Nevertheless, the feasibility of an all European army remains uncertain. European air forces depend on US-made platforms. The continued maintenance of F-35 fighter jets, for example, is not possible without American-controlled components and software. Although Europe collectively has approximately 2 million troops, these forces suffer from limited interoperability and coordination, weaknesses exposed during past operations such as the intervention in Libya.

Fragmentation is further reinforced by the existence of around 30 different defence procurement systems, which place European firms- including BAE systems, Leonardo and Thales- in competition rather than cooperation. National procurement has long structured the European defence market, keeping European defence firms much smaller and thus more expensive than their American counterparts, which benefit from a large domestic market. The US tends to favour bilateral agreements that reinforce this dynamic, rather than encouraging a genuinely integrated European industrial base. Attempts to overcome this fragmentation have however repeatedly struggled: France and Germany’s joint Future Combat Aircraft System has been plagued by disputes over intellectual property sharing, to the extent that the programme is at risk of being abandoned altogether.

Europe is not without leverage. The European Union can deny American defence firms valuable sales. European participation in US defence supply chains remains significant, with firms such as BAE Systems producing key components for platforms like the F-35. Should defence exports become overly politicised, this could have repercussions beyond Europe, potentially discouraging other major buyers, such as Japan and South Korea, to diversify procurement.

Furthermore, recent EU initiatives like Security Action for Europe (SAFE) are challenging the national procurement model by conditioning access to funding on the joint purchase of military equipment with another member state (this also includes Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Ukraine). Greater transnational procurement could generate economies of scale that would reduce procurement costs and allow Member States to obtain more capability for the same level of spending, which is comparatively high. With a combined population larger than that of the United States, Europe has the potential for a defence market as large as America’s, but lacks the single, unified procurement system. In the nuclear domain, proposals for France to play a greater role in extending nuclear deterrence to European partners have increasingly entered policy discussions.

Achieving full strategic autonomy would require significant investment. Rutte has suggested that defence spending would need to rise to as much as 10% of GDP to replace US support – a figure many view as politically unrealistic. Yet this estimate ultimately conflates Europe’s immediate security needs with the longer-term objective of replicating the full spectrum of US military capabilities, with lead times on defence procurement often spanning decades. In the short term, Europe’s primary concern remains deterring Russian offensive action, particularly along NATO’s eastern flank or in the Balkans. The key strategic choice facing Europe is whether continued reliance on the US, or the pursuit of a collective European defence mechanism, provides a stronger basis for its security.

Written by Aleksandra Tiso

Recommended Further Reading

Who Will Guarantee Europe’s Security?

Share this:

Like this:

Discover more from CISES