The conflict between Iran and a joint US-Israeli force enters its third week and shows no indication of de-escalation. Actors in the conflict have targeted economic, psychological and military targets across the Gulf. American embassies and interests across the Middle East and Muslim world have been subject to protests and attacks. While Western officials have focused on the immediate collapse of the Islamic Republic, little focus is dedicated to what comes next
The US and Israel have set Iran ablaze with little thought for the future: the proliferation of small arms, drone technology, radioactive materials, tens of millions of refugees and emboldened non-state actors may prove more dangerous than the war itself.
Iran’s military arsenals dwarf those of Iraq and Libya. After the 2003 Iraq War and the fall of President Muammar Qaddafi, opportunists stripped both countries’ arsenals bare. Man Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS) flooded African arms markets, threatening civilian aviation and state security. Two decades later, weapons from Saddam Hussein’s regime still circulate in Iraq. Looting of Iran’s arsenal would unleash a similar dynamic at an exponentially larger scale. The proliferation of these small arms would undermine governments across the Middle East and Central Asia, threatening nations’ capacity to enforce law and order and paving the way for terrorism, insurgencies and organised crime as far as Europe.
Iran’s uranium stockpiles are a subject of debate; it is unknown whether Iran has the capacity to make a conventional nuclear weapon. What is clear is that Iran has access to substantial radioactive materials. While non-state and hostile state actors alike may lack the technological capability to construct a conventional nuclear warhead, they would retain access to radioactive materials sufficient for the production of a dirty bomb. The psychological and economic disruption of the use, or threat thereof, of a dirty bomb would constitute a significant threat to governments worldwide.
Iran’s ballistic missile stockpiles are difficult to assess. Clearly Iran has sufficient stockpiles to sustain an aerial campaign against the U.S. and its partners in the Gulf. A sophisticated non-state actor drawn from remnants of the Iranian military could seize unsecured missile stockpiles, deploying them to further destabilise the region and undermine any hope of a transitional government emerging within Iran.
Most alarming are Iran’s drones and their technical packages reaching illicit markets. Dubbed ‘the poor man’s cruise missile,’ the Shahed Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle is a cheap, easy to manufacture one-time-use drone capable of being launched from standard civilian freight trucks. The Shahed series has proved effective enough to be reverse engineered and deployed by the United States as the Low-cost Unmanned Combat Attack System (LUCAS). While the drone itself poses a significant threat in hostile hands, the technical designs surrounding its production represents a greater long-term danger. Previous Iranian drone designs have already been domestically manufactured by non-state actors such as Ansar Allah (commonly referred to as the Houthis) and Hezbollah. Should technical designs for the Shahed be widely circulated, the production and utilisation of these drones by hostile actors would surely become an international security threat.
While most media coverage is concentrated on mass protests in Iran, little focus is dedicated to separatist insurgencies inside the country. Iran is engaged on two fronts, combating Kurdish insurgents in the west and Balochi separatists in the east, fighting for independence from Tehran. A collapse of the Iranian state would not end these conflicts but transform them. The Syrian civil war offers a compelling case study on how separatist groups gain from receding government authority. Kurdish separatist groups capitalised on the waning power of the Assad regime, establishing the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES). The creation of these proto-states in a volatile post-collapse Iran would have significant regional ramifications, providing a territorial safe haven for separatists across the region to coordinate, regroup, train and potentially distribute looted weaponry from Iranian stockpiles.
Pakistan may face the gravest consequences. Already confronting Balochi separatists and Islamist insurgents while engaged in sporadic conflict along its borders with India and Afghanistan, Pakistan’s security forces are overstretched. A weak Iran offers Balochi separatists a cross border safe haven, a steady supply of looted materiel and potentially the ability to manufacture their own drones. Pakistan’s already stretched security forces would be fighting a strengthened Balochi insurgency, Islamist groups, and volatile borders with Afghanistan and India simultaneously.
The Syrian and Libyan civil wars displaced millions of refugees across the Middle East and Europe. The collapse of regional law and order facilitated illegal migration and human trafficking further worsening the refugee crisis. Iran has a population of 90 million, more than double the combined populations of Libya and Syria.
Should Iran descend into chaos and civil war, millions of people would be displaced to neighbouring countries. Türkiye hosts almost 3 million refugees; Armenia hosts tens of thousands of displaced persons; and Pakistan hosts potentially millions of undocumented refugees. None of these nations would have the capacity to host a refugee exodus from a collapsed Iran.
In Europe an influx of Iranian refugees would dramatically alter the domestic political climate. Nations to Europe’s east, most notably Türkiye, have previously leveraged refugee crises to gain further concessions from Brussels. A collapse of Iran would hand Ankara a refugee crisis dwarfing the size of Syria’s. Europe would have no choice but to listen.
These scenarios are not distant possibilities; they have played out across the region over the past 30 years. Neither the US nor Israel appears to have learned important lessons from previous interventions. To quote Donald Rumsfeld “There are known knowns, known unknowns, and unknown unknowns.”This article has addressed the first two: the consequences of past governmental collapses in the region, and the dangers that can be anticipated but not fully measured. The unknown unknowns remain beyond prediction. Just as the fall of Saddam Hussein precipitated the rise of ISIS, what cannot be foreseen may ultimately prove more dangerous than what can be.
By Arthur Woollam-Hughes
References/recommended readings
Amnesty International (2015) ‘Iraq: “Islamic State” atrocities fuelled by decades of reckless arms trading’, Amnesty International, 8 December. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2015/12/islamic-state-atrocities-fuelled-by-decades-of-reckless-arms-trading/
Council on Foreign Relations (2026) Conflict between Turkey and armed Kurdish groups. Global Conflict Tracker. Available at: https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-between-turkey-and-armed-kurdish-groups
Eaton, T. (2025) ‘How conflict in Libya facilitated transnational expansion of migrant smuggling and trafficking’, Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank, 21 February. Available at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/02/how-conflict-libya-facilitated-transnational-expansion-migrant-smuggling-and-trafficking
Emmett, J., Ball, T. and Jenzen-Jones, N.R. (2026) ‘Shahed-131 & -136 UAVs: a visual guide’, Open Source Munitions Portal. Available at: https://osmp.ngo/collection/shahed-131-136-uavs-a-visual-guide/
Frantzman, S.J. (2026) ‘Iranian Kurdish groups unite against Tehran regime, Iraqi militias threaten Kurdistan Region’, FDD’s Long War Journal, 27 February. Available at: https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2026/02/iranian-kurdish-groups-unite-against-tehran-regime-as-iraqi-militias-threaten-kurdistan-region.php
Rubin, M. (2023) ‘Prepare for insurgency in Iran when the ayatollahs fall’, American Enterprise Institute (AEI) Opinion, 2 January. Available at: https://www.aei.org/op-eds/prepare-for-insurgency-in-iran-when-the-ayatollahs-fall/
Schroeder, M. (2015) Missing Missiles: The Proliferation of Man‑portable Air Defence Systems in North Africa. SANA Issue Brief No. 2, Small Arms Survey, Geneva, June. Available at: https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/resources/SAS-SANA-IB2-Missing-Missiles.pdf
Spyer, J. (2019) ‘Armed opposition groups in Iran’, JISS: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, 12 March. Available at: https://www.jiss.org.il/en/spyer-armed-opposition-groups-in-iran/
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2025) Syria refugee crisis explained. UN Refugees. Available at: https://www.unrefugees.org/news/syria-refugee-crisis-explained/
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