Following US-Israeli military strikes on Iran and the explicit objective of forcing regime change, analysts have attempted to gauge the likelihood of the Islamic Republic falling. It is generally believed that the plausibility of regime change in Iran cannot be evaluated with the same criteria as in Iraq or Afghanistan. Notably, the significance of the Iranian economy and of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) role in it appear less discussed than tactical and operational factors. Nonetheless, in recent decades, the IRGC has become increasingly embedded in Iran’s economic fabric through a network of parastatal corporations and organisations estimated to account for over 50 % of Iran’s GDP. As such, the extent of the IRGC’s role as an economic powerhouse could dissuade popular revolt and elite defection within Iran’s security apparatus, ultimately hindering prospects for a swift regime change.
The IRGC’s Parastatal Conglomerates
The IRGC retains vast influence over Iran’s major industries through a complex (and often opaque) network of affiliated holding companies and parastatal revolutionary organisations (bonyads) These bonyads were initially founded as charitable institutions aimed at advancing revolutionary objectives. However, they quickly developed into vast corporate conglomerates, active in the mining, real-estate, and agricultural industries. As institutions established in the wake of the revolution, their leadership was often directly appointed by the Supreme Leader. Along with a permissive legislative framework enabled by the Guardian Council – whose purpose it is to ensure institutional alignment with revolutionary principles –, this thus created an ideologically aligned and superintended network of economic actors.
In 2004, the Iranian Constitution was altered to allow the IRGC and its affiliated organisations to control up to 80 % of major sectors – particularly in the construction, transportation, telecommunications, banking, insurance, and defence industries. As such, the IRGC was able to expand its economic role in Iran’s “resistance economy” under global sanctions. The IRGC viewed itself as vital to take the lead in the Iranian economy while ensuring the ability to evade sanctions and channel proceeds to its own budget.
Today, the scope of the IRGC’s economic role has become difficult to measure. While some estimates attribute a third to two thirds of the country’s GDP to IRGC-affiliated companies and organisations, the opacity inherent to these ownership structures complicates any attempt at measuring the IRGC’s economic power. Nevertheless, it is widely accepted that the Revolutionary Guard exerts pervasive influence over Iran’s economy, embedding it deeply in the country’s economic fabric.
Hindering Popular Revolt
“When we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take. This will probably be your only chance in generations.”
This is the message that President Trump broadcasted to the people of Iran, urging them to revolt against the theocratic establishment. While widespread protests have spread through Iran before – the most recent of which sparked a violent response by security forces, with estimates of as many as 30,000 casualties – the likelihood of popular revolt overthrowing the theocratic system will depend on a wide array of factors including Iran’s complex and dispersed command and control structure and both the intent and capacity of the IRGC to suppress popular dissent.
Any future revolt must be aware of the IRGC’s role in the Iranian economy. The economy has become increasingly dependent on the IRGC’s diversified business empire. Foremost amongst these entities is Khatam al-Anbiya, an affiliated engineering firm responsible for development projects in the agricultural, energy, real-estate, pharmaceutical, and transportation industries. As such, the IRGC and its affiliates, by way of an economic multiplier effect, constitute a major driver of the economy. This has created a vast patronage structure in which it directly or indirectly employs part of the population – particularly the rural working class. Given Iran’s decentralised governance structure, prospects for regime change through popular revolt might ultimately hinge on the participation of segments of the population other than just those in Tehran.
Nevertheless, revolution is not unthinkable. In times of economic crisis, a more diverse mix of protesters take to the streets. This was the case in the 2025 protests, in which the devaluation of Iran’s currency, the rial, prompted widespread protests that also included social groups traditionally aligned with the theocratic system. Therefore, it is plausible that – aside from restricting government income from oil and gas revenues – Israeli attacks on Iran’s energy infrastructure are aimed at creating an aggravated economic downturn as a material incentive to stimulate popular uprisings.
Hindering Elite Defection
Prospects for regime change in Iran will not hinge on popular protests alone. Iran’s dispersed command and control structure forms part of a complex theocratic system aimed at withstanding external and internal pressure. Regime change is therefore highly unlikely without some degree of defection within the IRGC and the wider security apparatus.
Unlike other autocracies in the region, Iran’s governance structure does not hinge on one individual, such as in Saddam’s Iraq or Assad’s Syria. This is why Ayatollah Khamenei’s killing did not immediately cause a collapse of the entire system, for the system is built to withstand such blows. In this context, the IRGC – as a paramilitary organisation that is not subordinate to the president – plays an intensified role. As such, it has shown a high degree of agility through the rapid decentralisation of its mid-level tactical and operational decision-making.
As the IRGC has embedded itself in the Iranian economy, the interests of the economic elite are deeply intertwined with the theocratic system enabling its economic activities. Consequently, the Revolutionary Guard does not have an institutional interest in dismantling the system that sustains it. While factionalism does exist, as exemplified by a rift between the president and the IRGC after Iran struck its Gulf neighbours, competition operates within the bounds of the system, rather than fundamentally challenging it.
It therefore remains unlikely that – in absence of major IRGC defections – regime change can be effective without a widespread effort to dismantle Iran’s theocratic system. The system’s structural resilience ultimately hinges on the IRGC, which is deeply embedded in Iran’s economy and unlikely to act against its own interests. Regime change will thus require more than military pressure alone. It will demand a collapse of the IRGC’s patronage structure and defections within the security apparatus. In time, the fate of the Islamic Republic will not solely be decided on the battlefield, but within the very institutions that have sustained it over four decades.
By Henri Van der Veken
Recommended Reading
Ibrahim, S. (2026) – The ‘Fourth Successor’: Iran’s plan for a long war with the US and Israel
Reuters (2025) – How Iran moves sanctioned oil around the world
The Soufan Center (2026) – Iran’s ‘Mosaic Defense’ Strategy: Decentralization as Resilience Factor
Valadbaygi, K. (2025) – Beyond the IRGC: The rise of Iran’s military-bonyad complex