A common mistake in International Relations (IR) is trying to understand a state’s foreign policy without considering the provisions of its National Security Strategy (NSS) or the equivalent Grand Strategy document. What is even worse is naming a state’s behaviour towards third actors as its strategy –no matter how well data are collected, categorised and analysed– when this is merely a personal assessment of the state’s actions in regard to foreign actors. The reason why is very simple; strategy is by definition an actor’s official –thus usually in written form– plan that is distributed to its subordinates in order to provide the framework in which they can act to achieve specific results. To do so, strategy comprises an assessment of the actor’s (perception of its) environment (conditions, threats/risks, emerging trends and challenges), the desired ends (outcomes) to be achieved, the available means to achieve them, and the preferred ways for the means to be used.
In fact, the word “strategy” originates from the Greek word “strategos” (στρατηγός) which means “General” (the military rank), indicating a specific military plan used by an actor in combat to take advantage of its strengths, the enemy’s weaknesses and –of course– the terrain (geography) to achieve victory. When planning is conducted at the highest level of a state’s hierarchy –that is Head of State or Government– it is usually called Grand Strategy (it is also referred to as National Strategy), serving the basic function of keeping the state and its citizens safe from all kinds of hazards, not just military threats. Thus, Grand Strategy addresses multifaceted factors that can pose a threat to almost every dimension (military, economic, environmental, health, food, energy, etc.) of its national security, defines and prioritizes the state’s national interests, and facilitates resilience-building through the use of several instruments.
The basic concept that guides international relations and, therefore, remains at the core of every NSS is power, namely the ability of a state to change the behaviour of third parties to its favour. When this is done directly through the threat or use of coercive (usually military or economic) means, power is characterized as hard, while when it is done indirectly via influence –the result of the state’s culture, policies, and fundamental values it endorses– power is characterized as soft. A third recent category is smart power, when a state’s foreign policy utilizes both hard and soft power. That said, even though the threat or use of force is generally prohibited by International Law –unless it is conducted by a state for self-defence reasons– such behaviours unfortunately still occur in the name of national security under the provisions of NSS.
President Trump’s military intervention in Venezuela on 3 January 2026 for example is justified by the provisions of the 2025 National Security Strategy of the United States, as the document defines “peace through strength” and “predisposition to non-interventionism” as two of the principles that guide the U.S. foreign policy, setting ‘economic security’ through ‘energy dominance’ as a priority. It also expresses the aspiration “to restore American preeminence in the Western Hemisphere, and to protect […] access to key geographies throughout the region” through the reassertion and enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine. Moreover, it notes that the United States would “deny non-Hemispheric competitors the ability […] to own or control strategically vital assets” in the Western Hemisphere.
Another example of national-security-justified action is Operation Epic Fury launched against Iran on 28 February 2026, as the 2025 NSS refers that the Middle East is not being viewed as its primary priority anymore, but as a future “source and destination of international investment” in which the United States can cooperate with regional actors. Furthermore, it notes that the capabilities of Iran –which is characterized as “the region’s chief destabilizing force”– have been decreased significantly. Combining these provisions with the aforementioned two principles of “peace through strength” and “predisposition to non-interventionism” in addition to the principle of ‘balance of power’ which underlines that the United States “must prevent the global, and in some cases even regional, domination of others”, it is easily understood why the United States attacked Iran.
A third example is Greenland, the semi-autonomous territory of Denmark, in which President Trump wants desperately –even threatening to seize it– to gain access to, claiming that only the United States can provide security to it. Taking into consideration though that Greenland is rich in rare earths and that the 2025 NSS defines that one of the ways for the United States to enhance its economic security is by “securing access to critical supply chains and materials” referring that “This will require expanding American access to critical minerals and materials while countering predatory economic practices”, it is concluded that the real reason behind the United States’ desire to increase its footprint to Greenland is to enhance its economic security. Moreover, access to rare earths will boost the United States’ technology sector, facilitating the developing of advanced technologies which in turn will –according to the 2025 NSS– enhance its strength and help achieve peace through it.
The aforementioned three examples are only a few –but enough– that show why knowing the content of a state’s Grand Strategy is essential. Besides the United States though –which was the first state to institutionally endorse the concept of national security through the National Security Act of 1947– similar documents are also issued by several major actors, such as the National Security Strategy of Russia, the National Security Strategy of Japan, the National Security Strategy of Germany, the National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom, the National Strategic Review of France, and the White Paper on national security of China.
What is extremely important though is that despite these documents are dealing with national security issues most of them acknowledge the need for joint action between actors in order to address common regional and international security threats. Indeed, cooperative schemes –such as Alliances– have played a significant role in enhancing national, regional and international security through time. Nevertheless, since there are no friendships among states, it useful to remember that state cooperation is based on common (national) interests and mutual trust. This means that partnerships can be ruined if states no longer share the same interests and/or trust each other. Mistrust can be developed towards a state when the latter either fails to fulfill its membership obligations or does not comply with the Alliance’s rules.
While the first case applies for many NATO members –highlighted in the “Burden-Sharing and Burden-Shifting” priority of the 2025 NSS– as they had failed to fulfill their 2006 commitment of spending spend at least 2% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in defence, the second case has to do with President Trump’s decision to attack Iran without addressing the issue to either NATO nor the United Nations. Contrarily though to most NATO members that restored trust towards the United States by gradually reaching the 2% goal also agreeing to extend it to 5% during the 2025 Hague Summit, President Trump’s rhetoric against European NATO members seems to have severely damaged the Euro-Atlantic relations.
Finally it needs to be stressed that the greater the power a state possesses the greater the responsibility it bares is –or at least should be– due to the severe consequences of its use. This is not always the case though, as a states’ quest for (more) power usually leads to a constant struggle for dominance through coercion, not only in the traditional geopolitical domains of land and sea as described in the Heartland and Rimland theories, but also in the contemporary geopolitical domains of space, cyberspace and the information space described in the novel 2024 geopolitical theory of Hyperland. According though to Thucydides, the world famous historian and strategist of ancient Greece, this only leads to armed conflict and the deterioration of regional security –a phenomenon known as Thucydides’s Trap or security dilemma– as the rise of a state’s power is usually perceived by other (more powerful) states as a threat to their (national) security.
To conclude, a state’s NSS needs to be considered –just like the work of the Centre for International Security & Economic Strategy (CISES)– as the intersection of economics, security and geopolitics. It must also be stressed that by taking into consideration multiple factors related to the aforementioned three fields, NSS transforms a state’s foreign policy into specific national goals that need to be (unilaterally or collectively) achieved in order for the state’s territory, citizens, resources, critical infrastructure, and overall functioning to be protected. That is why a state’s foreign policy can only be understood by studying its National Security Strategy.
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Georgios Koukakis is a retired Lieutenant Colonel of the Hellenic Army (Special Forces/Infantry), a PhD Candidate in International Relations at the University of the Aegean (Greece) specializing in Greece’s Defence Diplomacy & National Security, the Academic Head of the ‘Security Studies in the Mediterranean’ educational program series of the Continuing Education & Lifelong Learning Center of the University of the Aegean, the Secretary General & a Senior Researcher at the Center for International Strategic Analyses (KEDISA), and a Research Associate of HERMES Institute of International Affairs, Security & Geoeconomy.