Russia has turned the strategic use of intelligence into an art form, but one of its most valuable assets has just slipped through its fingers. Russia’s use of intelligence as a diplomatic instrument has become a defining characteristic of its foreign policy, particularly since the invasion of Ukraine, with Moscow weaponizing the control and selective distribution of sensitive information as leverage in conducting negotiations, managing alliances, and strategically creating chaos to achieve geopolitical objectives (Jones 2022). However, Russia’s campaign against Ukraine has encountered a major roadblock with the loss of one of its most valuable intelligence assets. Viktor Orban’s loss in the April elections represents the loss of Russia’s most effective barricade in the European Union’s support for Ukraine and indicates a turning point in Europe’s internal balance, but also represents a door closing on Russia’s insider information into the European Union’s internal affairs.
Intelligence, Diplomacy, and the “Wedge-Driving” Strategy
Since the beginning of Russia’s war in 2022, Ukraine and its European supporters have sought to diplomatically isolate Russia in global institutions. Russia, in response, has sought to exploit informational asymmetries and political divisions among its adversaries, particularly the utilization of intelligence as both leverage and a bargaining chip (Fischer, 2023). A recent example of this tactic is Russia’s reported offer to the United States. Moscow allegedly proposed a quid pro quo arrangement in which it would refrain from sharing sensitive intelligence with Iran, including information related to U.S. military assets in the Middle East, in exchange for Washington ceasing its intelligence support to Ukraine (Politico 2026b). Although the United States reportedly rejected the proposal, the offer illustrates how Moscow uses intelligence as an instrument of leverage to target perceived weak links in adversarial coalitions to undermine support for Ukraine. By linking intelligence-sharing practices in one conflict, in which Russia is not directly involved, to concessions in another, Moscow attempts to impose strategic trade-offs on its rivals, hoping that strategic calculations in other regions, such as the United States’ war in Iran, will outweigh the benefit of support to Ukraine (Chatham House 2026). Russia has implemented this “wedge-driving” strategy in Europe, where internal divisions within the EU have offered opportunities for external manipulation.
Hungary as the EU’s Internal Weak Link
Perhaps the greatest weak link in the European Union since the beginning of the Russo-Ukraine war has been Hungary, exacerbated by the relationship between Vladimir Putin and Viktor Orban, which has remained notably closer and more cooperative than other EU members with Moscow. Orbán’s has remained institutionally aligned with the European Union and NATO but has been the primary crack in the EU’s unity against Russia, with Hungary becoming the member state most frequently blocking or delaying EU support for Ukraine. It has repeatedly vetoed a proposed €90 billion aid package, slowed or diluted sanctions on Russia, and obstructed other collective measures intended to sustain Kyiv’s war effort. Hungary’s weak link has had a substantial impact on the EU’s efforts, as the EU’s institutional design often required unanimity, with a single government able to stall or derail collective action. Hungary has exploited this leverage more consistently than any other member state (Euronews, 2025). EU officials and political leaders have often accused Budapest of undermining, and at times outright sabotaging, the bloc’s support for Ukraine (Guardian, 2026).
Intelligence Leakage and Institutional Exploitation
A further example of Russia’s exploitation of weak links and use of intelligence as leverage has recently come to light, with reports that Hungarian officials regularly shared sensitive details of EU deliberations and closed-door meetings with Russian counterparts (Politico 2026c). Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó has admitted to disclosing aspects of EU sanctions discussions to Russian diplomats, which heightened concerns that Hungary has functioned as an informational conduit, slipping through the major crack into the internal affairs of an adversarial coalition (Washington Post 2026). In response, EU officials have restricted the flow of classified information to Hungary and shifted discussion into smaller, more controlled diplomatic formats (Politico 2026a).
In this sense, Hungary’s impediment of EU affairs has gone beyond exploiting institutional mechanisms to obstruct political processes into actively breaching the EU’s confidentiality. Hungary, through its extensive veto of Ukrainian aid and regular exposing of internal deliberations, made it a uniquely valuable asset for Moscow’s strategy. Hungary’s position has offered two advantages to Moscow. First, its veto power allowed Hungary to regularly hinder or reshape EU policy from within, creating roadblocks in Western efforts to support Ukraine. Second, Hungary’s access to internal deliberations provided Russia insight into the EU’s strategic process and considerations. The revelation of the extent of the Hungarian-created cracks in the European Union led to eroded trust, fragmented communication, and weakened institutional cohesion, all of which aligned closely with Russian objectives.
The Strengthening of the Chain
However, the recent Hungarian elections have done much to begin to close this gap with the election of Péter Magyar. Magyar’s victory is a structural break in both dimensions of Hungary’s impediment of the EU, likely ending Hungary’s systematic obstruction and closing the critical informational vulnerability that provided Moscow insider access into Brussels.
A key pillar of Magyar’s campaign was rejecting the geopolitical balancing that defined Orbán’s governance. His supporters’ chants of “Russians go home” indicated a broader societal shift away from alignment with Moscow (New Voice, 2025). At the policy level, Magyar has committed to restoring closer ties with the EU and supporting Ukraine, which suggests that Hungary may transition from a saboteur to a facilitator within European decision-making, which would remove one of the most persistent obstacles to institutional unanimity on sanctions, funding, and military assistance (Reuters, 2025). From the intelligence standpoint, a new government seeking to align closer with Brussels has strong motivation to adhere closely to the intelligence-sharing and internal security policies of the EU, likely slamming shut the door through which Moscow has enjoyed insight into Brussel’s affairs. Magyar’s election has the potential to restore decision-making efficiency and reestablish as well as reinforce confidentiality within the EU system, both of which had been weakened throughout Orban’s tenure.
Under Orban, Hungary provided Moscow with a combination of access and leverage within the organization primarily responsible for aid to Ukraine. Through Hungary, Russia was able to observe and influence internal EU affairs while disrupting decision-making processes, exploiting the EU’s weak link to wreak havoc from within. Under Magyar, that weak link has likely been significantly strengthened, cutting off Russian access to the benefits it has enjoyed. Without a reliable internal interlocutor obstructing EU policy and exposing its deliberations, the effectiveness of Russia’s use of intelligence in the EU has faced a major setback. For the EU, the removal of Hungary as a consistent veto player could facilitate more coherent and efficient responses to the war in Ukraine, unhindered by an internal saboteur in either policy or intelligence.
While Moscow will likely continue using intelligence as leverage, the Hungarian case shows the necessity of weak links in this approach, countries that are willing to adjust their strategic considerations and take advantage of political conditions to cooperate with Russia on intelligence. Magyar’s election is an opportunity for the EU to close off a key avenue of external manipulation in their internal affairs, eliminating the weak link that has created the cracks in its cohesion.
Bibliography
Chatham House (2026) Spectator beneficiary player: Russia’s strategy in Iran war, oil, drones. London: Chatham House.
Euronews (2025) Hungary drops veto and agrees to prolong EU sanctions on Russian individuals.
Fischer, S. (2023) Diplomacy in the Context of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine. SWP Comment 2023/C 53, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (German Institute for International and Security Affairs)
Guardian (2026) ‘Political sabotage’: EU leaders accuse Hungary of undermining support for Ukraine. The Guardian, 23 February.
Jones, S.G. (2022) Russia’s Gamble in Ukraine. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
New Voice (2025) Russian propagandists were mocked at opposition rally in Hungary. The New Voice of Ukraine.
Politico (2026a) ‘EU limits intelligence flow to Hungary amid Russia leak concerns’, Politico Europe, April 2026.
Politico (2026b) ‘Russia offered intelligence deal to US involving Iran and Ukraine’, Politico Europe, April 2026.
Politico (2026c) European Commission calls for clarifications about report Hungary shared info with Russia.
Reuters (2025) Opposition Tisza Party leader launches new country campaign tour. Reuters. Washington Post (2026) EU expresses concern over reports that Hungarian foreign minister shared sensitive information with Russia during sanctions talks. The Washington Post, March.