Introduction
The early years of the Second World War established a specific system of technological progress for dual-use items. Research and development began in the windowless laboratories of the defence establishment funded by the state. Only after military requirements were met did these breakthroughs enter the civilian world, sometimes as unintended byproducts of innovations. The internet, GPS, and satellite communication all followed this trajectory. Today, the cutting edge is found in the commercial sector rather than government labs. The military has increasingly become a customer of these companies to keep up with rapid changes. Export controls and international law are structurally unfit for a world where private companies are controlling the most critical strategic technologies.
Exporting dual-use items
Dual-use materials include goods, software and technology that can be used for both civilian and military utilisation. Almost all modern technology falls into this category to some degree, making it the rule rather than the exception. Common examples are facial recognition, drones and specialist software that all have legitimate commercial uses but can also be used by repressive regimes. This creates a difficult dilemma for regulators who must allow trade while preventing the technical abuse of consumer products. The lines between a consumer product and a strategic weapon have largely disappeared in recent years. As a result it is a significant challenge to control these items without causing lasting harm to the wider economy.
Several multilateral regimes currently exist to manage these risks, such as the Wassenaar Arrangement which covers conventional arms and dual-use goods. Participating states share information and set standards to prevent the dangerous accumulation of weapons. They collectively decide which technologies to include on control lists and then apply national rules to those specific items. However, these lists can be too slow to update and struggle to keep pace with emerging capabilities. If a regime fails to include a new type of software or hardware, it can be exported freely even if it has military value. The current system increasingly struggles with the control of intangible digital tools and software that do not exist as physical objects.
The commercial battlefield
The war in Ukraine provides an example of how commercial technology now dictates military capability. When traditional secure communications failed, the Ukrainian military turned to Starlink satellite network. Over the years, both the Ukrainian and the Russian army have used SpaceX’s satellite communications on the battlefield. To manage this, SpaceX switched off its terminals, except for those on a ‘white list’ approved by the Defence Ministry in Kyiv. Private customers had to re-register with their personal ID numbers before getting reconnected to the network. This shows how a private company can have more influence over a conflict than a sovereign state.
In early 2024, the European Commission published a White Paper on Export Controls to address the growing geopolitical tensions. The goal was to update methods to safeguard security interests without blocking economic growth. Factors such as asymmetric warfare and the rapid growth of the tech sector make it hard to tell who the customer of the application really is. Streamlining these controls is necessary to protect national security in an unpredictable world. Governments must find a way to intervene in the market without owning or impeding innovation. Failure to adapt will leave many states vulnerable to technologies that are developed outside of their oversight.
Space governance
Space governance faces a similar obstacle as the 1967 Outer Space Treaty assumes that states are the sole actors. This framework is outdated now that single private companies own more satellites than all nations combined. When a multinational corporation manages orbital assets, the concept of national responsibility becomes very difficult to pin down. Having a state-centric focus in treaties leaves the private space sector mostly unregulated. Current treaties were not designed to manage a landscape where private profit and military strategy are so closely linked.
Towards a new system
Governments are now focusing on dual-use technology for several strategic reasons, such as cost-efficiency and faster access to innovation. Research from organisations like Arthur D. Little suggests that building these capabilities requires a clear, five-stage process to align private sector progress with national security. There are no easy answers when technology moves so much faster than the legal systems designed to oversee it. Any new regulation runs the risk of being either too weak to protect the state or too strong for the economy. Therefore, the focus should remain on creating a constant dialogue that can adapt as new threats emerge. This approach allows states to map civilian capabilities to military needs without impeding the growth of the private sector.
A central task for modern regulators is to decide which technologies require mandatory licensing or new liability frameworks for companies operating in conflict zones. Multilateral regimes like the Wassenaar Arrangement can help identify these emerging issues, but they must be supported by more agile procurement channels. Governments should encourage start-ups to propose commercial solutions for gaps in defence through open-topic solicitations and co-investment funds. These measures help bridge the gap between commercial standards and the resilience required for military use. If authorities fail to redraw the line between consumer tools and strategic weapons, they may soon find that the private market is the only force setting the rules.
The governance of outer space also requires an urgent update to reflect the dominance of private actors. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty must be updated or replaced with a framework that holds corporations accountable for how their orbital assets are used. This could involve new international agreements that specifically address the role of commercial satellite constellations in armed conflict. By establishing these norms now, we can prevent future space-based activity from spiralling into an unregulated arms race. Such a framework would provide more certainty that both private businesses and national militaries need to operate safely.
Recommended readings:
- Brockmann, K. & Héau, L. (2025): https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2025/spyware-service-challenges-applying-export-controls-cloud-based-cyber-surveillance-software
- Vaynman, J. & Volpe, T. A., (2023): doi:10.1017/S0020818323000140
- Aebi, T., Pankov, A., Malkov, A., Merhaba, A. & Stella, C. (2025): https://www.adlittle.com/fr-en/insights/viewpoints/unlocking-strategic-power-dual-use-technologies