The UN Security Council (UNSC) is the primary UN organ responsible for maintaining international peace and security under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. However, recent interstate crises and conflicts (Israel-Lebanon, Gaza, Rwanda-DRC, Armenia-Azerbaijan) are increasingly managed through parallel diplomatic channels, outside traditional conflict mediation frameworks.
This shift reflects two concurrent dynamics: firstly, structural constraints within the Council, including veto politics and divisions between permanent members, limiting its ability to act. Alongside this, states are deliberately investing in these parallel formats. Larger powers use them to advance security agendas outside multilateral constraints; regional and middle powers resort to them to assert diplomatic relevance beyond permanent membership.
Rather than signaling a decline of the UNSC, this evolution points to a transformation of its role as a coordination, monitoring and endorsement actor in contemporary crisis management.
The UN Charter places the Security Council at the center of international peace and security. Under Article 24 and Chapter VII, interstate conflicts fall within its mandate, giving this organ the authority to adopt binding resolutions in response to threats to peace. Yet, in practice, a growing gap has emerged between its formal mandate and how states actually manage crises on the international stage. For instance, discussions regarding Israel–Lebanon hostilities were conducted through US-led talks in Washington DC, rather than within the Security Council. Similar dynamics can be observed in Gaza negotiations for a ceasefire with the creation of the Board of Peace for Gaza involving key regional actors such as Qatar and Türkiye. This phenomenon can be observed beyond the Middle East: in the Luanda Process between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola was at the center of mediation since UNSC was blocked. A ceasefire agreement was reached in 2024. Lastly, negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan were conducted through bilateral channels, dissolving the OSCE Minsk Group.
This gap raises an important question: why is crisis management conducted outside the Security Council despite its central mandate?
Structural Constraints
The Council’s ability to act depends on agreement among its permanent members: any one of them can block action through the veto. Veto politics have repeatedly paralysed the UNSC and limited its capacity to respond to ongoing crises where strategic interests diverge: Gaza (US veto), Ukraine (Russia veto). The seven draft resolutions vetoed in 2024 were the most since 1986. Attempts to bypass this blockage through the UN General Assembly, via the Uniting for Peace resolution, have not resolved these limits, as the Assembly lacks binding authority.
At the same time, this situation has contributed to a growing reliance on regional organisations. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter explicitly encourages cooperation with regional actors. The April 2026 Presidency illustrates this trend: Bahrain organised the first-ever dedicated UN-GCC briefing, formalizing regional partnership in conflict times. Growing reliance on regional actors reflects both the Council’s difficulty to act directly and an evolving institutional practice with regional actors presented as better positioned due to their proximity to a given crisis.
A Parallel Mediation Format
Although great powers have the UNSC as an arena to raise concerns, these countries are increasingly resorting to other tracks. Alternative mediation approaches allow great powers to operate in less constrained environments with greater control over the agenda, the pace of negotiations, and of potential outcomes. The United States offers the clearest example. Washington’s bilateral talks between Israel and Lebanon, championed the Gaza Board of Peace with Qatar, Egypt and Türkiye, conducted negotiations with Iran outside the Council frameworks.
In some cases, bilateral formats also create space for advancing specific interpretations of international law, particularly around self-defence, without multilateral endorsement, pushing for the gradual normalization of certain security practices.
Middle Power Diplomacy
Parallel mediation formats have opened space for regional and middle powers without permanent seats or veto powers to take on a more visible role in crisis management.
Gulf states are the primary examples. Qatar has been central to the Doha Agreement between the Taliban and the US (2020) but also for multiple Gaza ceasefires. Its ability to maintain open channels with actors designated as terrorists such as Hamas and the Taliban (when Western powers cannot) helps Qatar position itself as an indispensable intermediary. Türkiye is following a similar pattern: its key role in the Astana process and Ukraine grain corridor acting as a neutral mediator gives Ankara access to both sides of conflicts. Mediation becomes a core instrument of its regional and international influence.
Beyond the Middle East, Angola, during the Luanda process brokered a permanent ceasefire agreement between the RDC and Rwanda, filling the gap when the UNSC was blocked. Similarly, the Amenia-Azerbaijan peace process led to the formal dissolution of OSCE Minsk Group and opened the door for smaller states such as Kazakhstan, Georgia and Switzerland to act as facilitators alongside the US and EU.
This growing role does not replace the authority of the Security Council, but it contributes to a redistribution of mediation functions that is no longer incidental but structural.
CONCLUSION
The shift of crisis management beyond the UNSC is not temporary but reflects a structural transformation of the international system toward multipolarity which creates several implications for the current UN framework:
- Parallel mediation formats can carry risks: agenda-driven mediation, issues with neutrality, and international law violations when security interpretations are promoted without any multilateral endorsement. Agreements negotiated outside UN frameworks are thus less likely to incorporate monitoring, compliance or justice mechanisms.
- The UNSC can adapt by strengthening its coordination role with regional actors under Chapter VIII rather than attempting to maintain a monopoly over crisis-management it can no longer keep.
- The rise of middle powers as mediators represents a redistribution of diplomatic power beyond P5 membership, accelerating broader debates on Security Council reform and the shift toward an endorsement and monitoring organ that could oversee outcomes reached elsewhere rather than driving them.
Recommended Readings
Prantl, J. (2006) ‘Part I: Informal Groups of States and the UN Security Council: Grasping the Dynamics’, in The UN Security Council and Informal Groups of States: Complementary or Competing Governance? Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at https://academic.oup.com/book/32552
Ruys, T. (2010) ‘Armed Attack and Other Conditions of Self-Defence’, in ‘Armed Attack’ and Article 51 of the UN Charter: Evolutions in Customary Law and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/armed-attack-and-article-51-of-the-un-charter/armed-attack-and-other-conditions-of-selfdefence/F5558C40B0866BE14B8119D88ECEC021
Security Council Report (2024) The Veto. Available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org