Executive Summary
The 2026 Hungarian Parliamentary elections were particularly consequential for the country and the whole of the European Union (EU). This election decided whether Budapest would continue to collaborate with the Kremlin or if it would move closer to the EU after years of disputes with Brussels. On April 12th, 2026, voters chose the latter, ending 16 years of Fidesz control and handing the Tisza opposition party a majority in parliament (Kirby, 2026). Under Péter Magyar’s leadership, the Tisza party seeks a more collaborative relationship with the EU and to end the country’s veto of aid for Ukraine. However, the loss of Putin’s closest ally in the EU is likely to have several security implications. The EU can expect to see an uptick in hybrid attacks from Russia, as well as a pivot by the Kremlin towards closer relations with Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico as the last Russian ally in the EU. In order to counter Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), the EU and Hungary must employ a more comprehensive security framework. Additionally, careful attention should be paid to Slovakia as the Kremlin is likely to push for a closer relationship with Prime Minister Robert Fico.
Introduction & Background
The win of the Tisza party in the 2026 Hungarian relations may represent a new era of closer cooperation for Budapest and Brussels, but also poses new security concerns. While EU member states largely cut ties and sanctioned Russia after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Hungary under the Fidesz party became an outlier in the organization as it developed closer relations with Russia (Zgut-Przybylska, 2024). During its last 16 years in power, the Fidesz party has centralized its media ecosystem and regularly repeated Kremlin talking points. Furthermore, when neighboring countries expelled Russian diplomats after the invasion, Budapest allowed the embassy to increase its staff (Krekó, 2022, p. 2-3). Over the past four years, the country has blocked EU funding for Ukraine, as it has consistently vetoed support for the country (Mackrael and Norman, 2026).
These actions can be attributed to the strong relationship the Fidesz party formed with their Russian counterparts. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán continued to meet Putin multiple times since the war began which had largely halted other EU leaders’ visits to Moscow (Thorpe and Jackson, 2025). The collaboration between the two governments became especially evident after the Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó was discovered to be sharing confidential information from EU meetings with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov (Wakulska, 2026). However, after the results of the April 12th, 2026 election, it appears that the Orban era is over. The Tisza party’s capture of 70% of parliament will allow the country to reassert its place in the EU and distance itself from Moscow (Roos, 2026). It remains to be seen, however, how Russia will respond now that its closest EU partner is no longer likely to collaborate with the Kremlin. The new situation in Budapest represents both hope that Hungary will once again collaborate with the EU on Ukraine and also concern that the loss of Orban may lead to heightened hybrid attacks from Russia in the country.
Discussion & Analysis
A positive implication for the EU after this election is the change in policy towards Brussels. Under the leadership of Péter Magyar, the Tisza party has a more pragmatic view of the EU than the Fidesz party, as it views the organization as allowing for Europe to more equally compete with large powers such as the United States and China. Thus, the new government desires closer cooperation with Brussels, also in hopes that it may regain suspended EU funds. Additionally, the new governing party has stated it would like to repair tense relationships with its neighbors Poland and Czech Republic. Most consequential for the EU, though, is that Budapest will no longer veto EU support for Ukraine, though it remains adamant that it will not supply weapons or troops (Végh, 2026). Where the country is able to distance itself further from Russian influence, however, is through transitioning away from its dependence on Russian energy. Currently, Russia supplies over 80% of Hungary’s energy supply (Thorpe and Jackson, 2025). Under Orban, energy diversification was treated as too difficult and expensive. In contrast, Tisza has claimed that it wants to diversify energy sources beyond its historical Russian dependence. This would bring the country in line with a majority of its EU partners who moved away from Russian energy after the invasion in 2022 (Végh, 2026).
This transition to a new governing party is likely to cause difficulties and could pose security risks for both the EU and Russia. After more than a decade under Fidesz rule, many Hungarian institutions are still controlled by entities loyal to the party (Roos, 2026). This presents an opportunity for Russia to continue its influence in the country. However, the Kremlin would likely need to shift towards more conventional hybrid operations in the country like it has in other EU states. This may include cyber attacks, violating national airspace, cutting communication cables, and leading disinformation campaigns (Jones, 2025). Hungary remains vulnerable to these tactics as it lacks a sufficient plan for defending itself against Russian hybrid warfare. The country’s last National Security Strategy in 2020 identified several potential hybrid threats, but declined to explicitly name a country (Prochazka et al., 60). Thus, its defense strategy lacks specificity and must be updated.
While it increases hybrid operations in Hungary, Russia may potentially push for a closer relationship with its only remaining partner in the EU; Slovakia, under Robert Fico. Russia currently supplies a majority of the oil used in the country, while the rest of the EU — soon including Hungary — have diversified their energy sources (Sullivan, 2026). Prime Minister Fico has a distinctly pro-Russian stance and regularly echoes Kremlin disinformation narratives. These narratives are anti-EU in nature and stress a pan-Slavic angle that connects Slovak and Russian culture. Under Fico, the government has grown closer to the Russian government, with Fico meeting Putin in both 2024 and 2025 (Batka and Koníková, 2). These factors create a basis for Russia to become more influential in the country and pose a threat to the EU.
Conclusion & Policy Recommendations
In order to combat Russian hybrid warfare in Hungary, Slovakia, and the EU at large, the organization must create a more comprehensive security framework. Currently, the organization employs a “hybrid toolbox” which exposes hybrid threats and tailors responses to individual circumstances. This includes deploying “hybrid rapid response teams”, protecting critical infrastructure, safeguarding elections from disinformation, enhancing cybersecurity, and collaborating with partners like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (European Council, n.d.). While this is a step in the right direction, the unconventional nature of hybrid warfare presents unique and complex problems which require states to approach aggressors carefully.
On a domestic level, the new Hungarian government must create an updated National Security Strategy with tactics specifically meant to counter Russian hybrid warfare. A new strategy should first align itself with the EU by recognizing Moscow as a threat to Hungarian security. This may allow for a more targeted defense strategy and better alignment with the existing hybrid warfare toolkit. Additionally, the new government should begin publicly exposing hybrid threats originating from Russia (Pociumban and Nierhaus, 2026). Finally, the country should begin the process of decentralizing its media system, allowing for alternative viewpoints that were restricted under the Fidesz government (Spike, 2024).
Since the Kremlin is losing its closest partner in the EU, it may pivot towards Slovakia under Prime Minister Fico. The country publicly opposed a 2025 European Commission plan to cease all energy imports from Russia to the EU, stating that this would increase domestic energy prices (Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic, 2025). This continued reliance on Russian energy puts the country at risk of coercion and indirectly funds the country’s war on Ukraine. Despite this security risk and possibility of alternative sources, both Slovakia and Hungary have remained reliant on the country for their energy requirements (Gavin, 2025). Now that Hungary is likely to transition from Russian energy reliance, the Kremlin may wield its energy ties with Slovakia to coerce the country.
The 2026 Hungarian elections came at a critical moment for the EU as it balances the fourth year of war in Ukraine and its response to a war in Iran which threatens its energy supply. While Hungary appears to be turning towards a more collaborative relationship with the EU, this also poses the threat of heightened Russian hybrid warfare in the organization. Due to these factors, the EU must prioritize mending relations with Hungarian leadership and guiding a comprehensive security strategy for the country. Furthermore, it should monitor Slovakia for elevated foreign interference, especially as the country is due for parliamentary elections in 2027 (Dlhopolec, 2026). Ultimately, the win of the opposition party in Budapest represents a potential for a more amicable relationship with Brussels, but also requires the organization to elevate its security framework towards the Russian Federation.
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