During the Ministerial Meeting on the Reform of the UNSC held in Nairobi on March 11th, the AU Chairperson reaffirmed the African Union (AU) longstanding demand of a UNSC expansion, precisely more African representation with two permanent seats and five non-permanent seats. The demand is grounded in an imbalance very difficult to dismiss: Africa remains central to the UNSC agenda: South Sudan, Sudan and Libya are on this month programme and Libya, the DRC, South Sudan and Western Sahara were on the agenda in April. Yet, the continent holds no veto power. With two countries in the current Council rotation, decisions directly affecting the continent’s security continue to be adopted without a permanent African voice.
Beyond representativity, the issue is legitimacy. The current UNSC structure still reflects post WWII geopolitical realities leaving Africa primary a subject of the Council’s meetings rather than a real participant in the decision-making of its own history. However, greater representation does not automatically translate into greater influence or greater capacity to act. The AU structural constraints raise an important question the reform debate cannot avoid: who would speak on behalf of Africa? For which Africa? Would those permanent seats improve the African Union’s ability to act on African crises?
A legitimate and urgent case
Since its creation in 1945, Africa is the only continent with no permanent representation within the Security Council despite representing approximately 80% of the Council’s resolutions over the last decade. In 2025, 45% of said resolutions focused on an African country or a situation taking place on the continent without a single African state holding permanent decision-making power. In practice, the continent is governed more than it governs.
The AU demand for two permanent seats and five non-permanent seats therefore appears urgent and difficult to dismiss. It is not merely a question of representation; it is also a question of legitimacy. The current structure of the UNSC still reflects post-WWII geopolitical realities, while African states remain underrepresented despite their demographic, political and economic weight. Eight decades later, that imbalance has not been corrected.
The consequences extend beyond mere frustration: The Council’s authority on the continent is incredibly perceived as an unequal treatment, an external imposition rather than global and collective security governance. Thus, the continent appears primarily as a subject of the organ’s discussions and decisions rather than a real participant in decision-making. Avoiding the issue any longer can only undermine the legitimacy of international interventions, complicate cooperation with regional actors and feeds a broader narrative of a security order designed by and for others. The case of reform is urgent and overdue.
A game of musical chairs: which Africa would speak?
The first practical question arising following representativity is which of the 55 member states of the African Union would actually sit at the UNSC. There is currently no clear nor agreed mechanism to designate which states would occupy those seats. Would the designation be permanent or rotational? On what basis would states be selected? economic power, demographic weight, or geopolitical considerations? Who would ultimately decide? A consensus among 55 members seems highly unlikely.
The deeper problem is that AU member states often act on their own, according to their national interests, outside of the organisation’s framework and not the collective AU position. Morocco’s normalisation with Israel through the Abraham Accords illustrated divisions on the Gaza issue within the continent. Lastly, the alliance of Sahel states was created outside the AU and ECOWAS frameworks, which further reflects this growing fragmentation. These are not isolated incidents but are symptoms of a union straining at the seams.
Adding to these internal divisions, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso are also suspended from the AU including following their respective military coups. Could they be eligible to obtain a seat? If not, who would represent politically fragmented regions at the UNSC?
Without stronger coordination within the continent and a binding mechanism ensuring the new permanent seat holders advance collective the Union positions, permanent seats could reproduce internal divisions at the global level rather than reduce them.
A fractured house: capacity issues and financial dependence
The African Union has not remained passive in continental crises. It developed a peace and security architecture: a Peace and Security Council, anti-coup frameworks, mediation initiatives and an early-warning system. However, many of these mechanisms struggled to produce durable outcomes: in the Sahel, early warning mechanisms failed and repeated coups continued despite the Union’s anti-coup norms and suspension mechanisms. Some mediation initiatives also gradually moved outside AU frameworks, for instance through the Luanda Process.
Additionally, the financial picture compounds the problem. The AU remain heavily dependent on external funding, with approximately two-thirds of its 2023 budget coming from external sources such as the EU, the UN and the US. The adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2719 in December 2023, which allows AU missions to receive up to 75% of their budget from UN-assessed contributions, further illustrates this structural dependence.
These issues create an important contradiction difficult to ignore: seeking an autonomous voice at the UNSC while remaining financially and operationally dependent on external actors, sometimes the very same powers from whom greater autonomy is sought. Under these conditions, a permanent seat would simply relocate the dependency to a more consequential stage.
The AU demand for UNSC representation is legitimate and difficult to dismiss. However, institutional reform alone is unlikely to transform the Union into a more effective security actor.
· Without stronger coordination and mechanisms to determine who speaks and on what basis, permanent seats risk reproducing Africa’s divisions at the global level.
· Without financial autonomy, an African voice at the UNSC risks remaining structurally dependent on the very powers it seeks to balance.
· The reform debate ultimately points to a prior question: not whether Africa deserves representation, it does, but whether the AU is institutionally ready to make use of it. A permanent seat is only as valuable as the unity behind it.
FURTHER READINGS
African Union (2005) The Ezulwini Consensus.
Eurasia Review (2024) Alliance of Sahel States: Beginner’s Guide.
Institute for Security Studies (2024) Dealing with coup transitions competently and with consistency, PSC Insights.
International Peace Institute (2024) UN Support to AU-Led Peace Support Operations.
ISS Africa (2024) Financial independence is key to stronger AU partnerships.
Security Council Report (2023) Financing African Union-Led Peace Support Operations.