The imaginary ‘Moscow–Tehran axis’ against Western global hegemony
On 17 January 2025, in Moscow, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement between Russia and Iran. [1] The agreement took effect on 2 October 2025.
The Russian–Iranian agreement resulted from years of developing bilateral relations, dating back to the early years of Putin’s rule. The first key document marking the convergence of their political interests was the Treaty on the Fundamentals of Mutual Relations and Principles of Cooperation, signed on 12 March 2001. [2] Russia’s intensifying neo-imperial policy and successive international aggressions (Georgia 2008, Ukraine 2014) led it to distance itself politically from the West and to forge closer ties with Iran as its main partner in the Persian Gulf region. The two regimes cemented their alliance during Syria’s civil war, jointly backing Bashar al-Assad. Their partnership took on new urgency after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, with Iran providing decisive military technology, notably drones. The war against Ukraine, Assad’s defeat in Syria, and unpredictable US Middle East policy drove the 2024 Russian–Iranian agreement.
Prior to the US–Israeli operation, some analysts observed that the Russia–Iran ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ lacked substantive commitments. (I can recommend my commentary for CISES of 23 January 2026 [3]). Despite the absence of formal commitments, Russian officials presented themselves as indispensable allies. Sergey Lavrov told Iranian television in December 2025 that Russia had ‘never betrayed its friends or allies.’ [4] Russian state media disseminated pro-Iranian narratives, portraying the partnership as central to challenging Western dominance. In February 2026, Russia conducted a naval exercise with Iran in the Strait of Hormuz, aiming to demonstrate military solidarity.
The brutal reality: Russia neither can nor wishes to save the Ayatollah regime
Russia’s limited response to the US–Israeli assault revealed the actual function of ‘strategic’ agreements: they primarily serve Russia’s interests rather than ensuring the security of its partners. During the attacks on Iran, Russia’s response was limited to a brief protest by the Foreign Ministry, lacking substantive action. [5] On 3 March 2026, Lavrov explicitly ruled out any retaliatory measures against the United States. [6] Putin issued only a formal condolence following Khamenei’s death. [7] Why did this happen? Today, it can be said that Russia neither can nor wishes to save the Ayatollah regime.
Russia lacks the real means to provide effective military assistance to Iran. Russia urgently needs air and missile defence, whose effectiveness is questionable given US and Israeli technological superiority, because Ukrainian drone and missile strikes against Russian military and energy infrastructure have intensified. Transferring such systems to Iran would be logistically complex and time-consuming and would likely not significantly improve Iran’s military situation. Above all, such a transfer would further weaken Russia’s already strained defences.
Russia cannot feasibly intervene directly against the United States or Israel. Such a conflict does not fit Russia’s short- or medium-term strategic plans (unlike a regional conflict in Europe), and Russia lacks the military capacity to engage in such a confrontation. Russia has already shown this limitation in the Middle East by failing to defend Assad’s regime. Facing Donald Trump’s assertive policy, Putin is unlikely to risk any armed confrontation with the United States, even a limited one, especially since he is counting on continued US pressure on Ukraine to end the Russian–Ukrainian war on terms favourable to Russia, whether through victory or concessions that Russian propaganda can present domestically as a win.
Another factor contributing to Russia’s passivity toward Iran is the potential for immediate political and economic benefits resulting from a new Middle East conflict. Increased US involvement in the region may divert American attention from Europe, particularly Ukraine. As the US midterm elections approach, a lack of swift success against Iran could prompt the United States to intensify pressure on Ukraine to reach a settlement with Russia, which could be presented to American voters as a foreign policy achievement. Additionally, rising oil prices, limited enforcement of sanctions against Russia’s shadow fleet, and indecision within the European Union may bolster Russia’s economy, which has been declining since early 2026. Nevertheless, while these factors influence Russia’s approach to Iran, their overall significance should be viewed with caution.
Russia does not want to fulfil any alliance commitments
Russia consistently follows a pattern of remaining silent or inactive when its allies encounter crises. This behaviour was evident during the Armenia-Azerbaijan war, despite Armenia’s membership in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), as well as in its limited support for Assad and Maduro. Such promises lack substantive fulfilment. The main exception to this pattern, the CSTO intervention in Kazakhstan in January 2022, helped Kassym-Jomart Tokayev maintain his hold on power. Russia’s advanced preparations for the war against Ukraine and Putin’s determination to prevent instability in Kazakhstan at a crucial moment for Russia’s strategic plans explain this case.
For Russia, alliances primarily function to consolidate Moscow’s dominance and project the image of a global sphere of influence, rather than to ensure mutual security. Consequently, such ‘partnerships’ are instruments of subordination rather than genuine protection. Therefore, Russia’s commitments are likely to remain largely declarative unless fulfilling them aligns with the Kremlin’s immediate interests or avoids revealing the disparity between propaganda and actual capabilities. Alliances and partnerships primarily serve to enhance Russia’s international image and influence, rather than to guarantee their partners’ security.
Professor Marcin Składanowski is a Senior Fellow at CISES and a Professor of Russian and International Security Studies at the Catholic University of Lublin, Poland.
References
[1] Договор о всеобъемлющем стратегическом партнёрстве между Российской Федерацией и Исламской Республикой Иран (Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran), http://kremlin.ru/supplement/6258.
[2] Договор об основах взаимоотношений и принципах сотрудничества между Российской Федерацией и Исламской Республикой Иран (Treaty on the Foundations of Relations and Principles of Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran), https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/international_contracts/international_contracts/2_contract/46488/.
[3] Marcin Składanowski, Russia and the Protests in Iran: What Outcome Is Putin Really Interested In?, https://cises.org/2026/01/25/russia-and-the-protests-in-iran-what-outcome-is-putin-really-interested-in/.
[4] Интервью Министра иностранных дел Российской Федерации С.В.Лаврова медиакорпорации «Гостелерадио Ирана», Москва, 15 декабря 2025 года (Interview with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, S.V. Lavrov, media corporation ‘Gosteleradio Iran’, Moscow, 15 December 2025) https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2065749/.
[5] Агрессия против Ирана и планы США на другие страны. Заявления Лаврова (Aggression against Iran and the US plans for other countries. Statements by Lavrov), https://tass.ru/politika/26628855.
[6] Лавров: санкций против США в связи с ситуацией вокруг Ирана ждать не стоит (Lavrov: sanctions against the US in connection with the situation around Iran are not to be expected), https://tass.ru/politika/26626569.
[7] Соболезнования в связи с убийством Верховного руководителя Исламской Республики Иран Сейеда Али Хаменеи (Condolences on the assassination of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Seyed Ali Khamenei), http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/79238.
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